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Federalism and the Rehnquist Court
by
CALVIN MASSEY*
Little more than a year before William Rehnquist became Chief
Justice, the Supreme Court decided Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority,1 in which the Court appeared to bury
much of judicially enforceable federalism and to replace it with a
politically enforceable brand of federalism. The "structure of the
Federal Government itself" was the principal safeguard of state
sovereignty, at least as manifested by immunity from congressional
exercise of the commerce power.2 The fact that Congress is composed
of state representatives was deemed sufficient to protect state
autonomy. "Any substantive [judicial] restraint.., must find its
justification in the procedural nature of this basic limitation, and it
must be tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national
political process rather than to dictate a 'sacred province of state
autonomy."' 3  Three years later, in South Carolina v. Baker,4 the
Court hinted that these procedural "failings" consisted only of such
extreme things as depriving a state of "any right to participate in the
national political process"5 or legislation that "single[s] out" a state in
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Visiting
Professor, Boston College Law School, 2000-2002. I am grateful to Scott Sundby and
Washington & Lee Law School, Wayne State Law School, and my colleagues at Hastings
for opportunities to present earlier versions of this paper and receive useful comments
about its substance.
1. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
2. Id. at 550. The specific issue in Garcia was whether Congress had authority to
extend the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act to
employees of a municipal bus transit authority. Garcia overturned the rule, originating in
Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), and clarified by Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981), that barred Congress from
using its commerce power to regulate the "States as States" on matters of state sovereignty
in a fashion that "would directly impair their ability 'to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional governmental functions."' Hodel, 452 U.S. at 287-88 (quoting Nat'l
League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852).
3. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554 (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,236 (1983)).
4. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
5. Id at 513.
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a way that leaves it "politically isolated and powerless."6 After fifty
years of ever increasing judicial deference to congressional
determination of the scope of the commerce power, this was hardly
surprising.7 Ever since 1937 the grip of judicial review on issues of
federalism had been relaxing; by 1988 it might well be thought to be
the fragile grasp of a comatose patient.
But the patient has revived. Mark Twain thought that rumors of
his death had been greatly exaggerated." The dissenters in Garcia
said much the same thing about judicial review of federalism.9 Since
then the Rehnquist Court has revived judicially enforceable
federalism in four important ways: by limiting the source of
congressional power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity,"
by limiting the scope of Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment and reducing judicial deference to congressional
judgments about the scope of that power," by reducing substantially
the degree of judicial deferen~e to congressional determination of the
scope of the commerce power, 2 and by immunizing states from
certain ways in which Congress might exercise its commerce power.3
Commentary about these developments has been mostly critical.
The principal claim of the critics is that the Court should not exercise
meaningful judicial review of federalism issues. This is said to be true
either because the original plan of the Constitution contemplated
political enforcement of federalism rather than judicial enforcement, 4
or because there are no practicable standards for judicial enforcement
of federalism.'5 The former claim is highly contestable 16 and the latter
is usually directed at the Court's recent energetic scrutiny of the
6. Id.
7. The post-1937 evolution of commerce clause doctrine is so well known it hardly
needs documentation. Any good constitutional law casebook or treatise describes those
developments. See, e.g., CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS
AND LIBERTIES 194-207 (2001).
8. In 1897, while in London, Clemens sent a cable to that effect to the Associated
Press. See JOHN BARTLETr, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 679 (13th ed., 1955).
9. Justice Rehnquist, as he then was, noted laconically that he need not belabor "the
fine points of a principle that will, I am confident, in time again command the support of a
majority of this Court." Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
10. See infra Part II, § C.
11. Sce infra Part II, § D.
12. See infra Part II, § B.
13. See infra Part II, § A.
14. See Larry Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000).
15. See, e.g., Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Search for a Judicially Enforceable
Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REV. 849,900-22 (1999).
16. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated
Powers" In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1995); John C.
Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311 (1997).
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commerce power, especially in such cases as United States v. Lopez17
and United States v. Morrison.1 8 Moreover, because Americans have
always employed federalism in an expedient fashion,19 it should not be
surprising that these commentaries focus on the supposed
instrumental quality of the Court's revival of judicially enforceable
federalism. To be sure, some commentators regard the entire issue of
federalism, defined as preservation of "the right of states to act
independently, in furtherance of goals the national government does
not share,"2 as a "national myth,.., a neurosis, a dysfunctional belief
to which we cling despite its irrelevance to present circumstances.,
21
I have a different perspective. Federalism is not a dysfunctional
anachronism, a nostalgic symbol of a pre-industrial America. Rather,
when properly viewed and applied, it is crucial to preservation of
individual liberty and a valuable device to preserve a healthy balance
of power among governmental institutions. The institutional benefits
17. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
18. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
19. This history of expedience begins in earnest within a quarter-century after
constitutional ratification. The Hartford Convention of New England states contemplated
secession; twenty years later South Carolinians concocted nullification; in another twenty-
five years New Englanders resisted secession as treason; within another thirty years
southern and western populists were demanding federal regulation of railroads and other
industrial enterprises. For a fuller account, see Calvin R. Massey, The Locus of
Sovereignty: Judicial Review, Legislative Supremacy, and Federalism in the Constitutional
Traditions of Canada and the United States, 1990 DuKE L.J. 1229. In the twentieth
century, politic°,! liberals championed the power of the federal government for wealth
redistribution and ending the odious state practices of racial subordination but turned to
the independence of state governance institutions as soon as political conservatives began
to exert more influence on Congress, the Presidency, and the federal judiciary. Likewise,
political conservatives of the late twentieth century, erstwhile champions of state
autonomy, after gaining control of Congress have not hesitated to propose all manner of
new federal initiatives that would curb state autonomy in the name of the conservative
social vision. See, e.g., William Marshall, American Political Culture and the Failures of
Process Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 139, 141-44 (1998).
20. Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REv. 903,913 (1994).
21. Id at 950. Rubin and Feeley distinguish federalism from decentralization. The
latter is a policy adopted by a central authority that local autonomy is the most efficacious
way of achieving some desired goal, "a purely managerial decision by a centralized
authority." Id. at 911. By contrast, federalism "is not a managerial decision by the central
decision-maker... but a structuring principle for the system as a whole," one that allows
"normative disagreement amongst the subordinate units so that different units can
subscribe to different value systems." Il at 911-12. Rubin and Feeley argue that some
familiar arguments made in favor of federalism-public participation, citizen choice, state
competition, and experimentation-are really arguments for decentralization and that the
only genuine arguments for federalism-diffusion of power and preservation of
community-are unpersuasive. They contend that there has been an inadequate showing
that increased federal power has in fact decreased individual liberty and argue that the
relevant political community in America is a national community.
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of federalism are not simply preservation of state autonomy as a
counter to federal power but also operate less directly to preserve the
scheme of separated powers within the federal government. Whether
federalism is properly enforceable primarily by the judiciary or the
national political process presents a quite separate issue. To the
extent that federalism is seen as merely a question of how much
decentralization of power the national managers think is
appropriate,' federalism is an entirely political matter. But if
federalism presents genuine issues of individual liberty and
preservation of a balance of power between government institutions,
the need for judicially enforceable federalism becomes much
stronger.
Individual liberty is a slippery and multifaceted concept.
Because the Constitution acts almost entirely as a brake upon
government power it is easy to assume that liberty inheres in freedom
from government power. But liberty also inheres in the freedom to
decide through one's democratically elected representatives how
government power is to be exercised. Of course, this liberty can be
exercised on a national, state, or local level, and some people might
say that it does not occasion any loss of liberty if such decisions are
uniformly made at the national level. This conclusion, however,
misses the point: Liberty is advanced by a dispersal of decision-
making authority that creates variation of public policy within the
nation. In other words, one aspect of liberty is variation in the
policies that result from exercise of government power. This idea will
be elaborated in Part I.
Liberty is more than freedom from government power and
freedom to exercise government power. Governments are not the
only source of human oppression in our complex interdependent
world and the exercise of government power to curb private acts of
intolerable oppression undoubtedly operates to advance human
liberty. The use of government power to limit private racial prejudice
in American public life is, of course, the obvious example. Whatever
loss of liberty was suffered by racial bigots by the advent of federal
civil rights legislation was surely outweighed by the gains in liberty
accorded to long-suffering racial minorities. Of course, this
calculation of "net liberty" involves a subjective assessment that the
liberty of acting on racial prejudice in public life is of much less value
than the liberty of equal participation in public life. While nobody of
good will now disagrees with this assessment that is because we have
22. In essence this is the Rubin and Feeley position. Although they distinguish
between federalism and decentralization, their rejection of federalism as irrelevant to
modern American circumstances leaves them embracing an entirely politically enforceable
neo-federalism that they call decentralization. See supra note 20.
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made a societal judgment about the nature of liberty in the context of
race and public life. Thus, liberty has a socially contingent quality. A
federalism that preserves and increases human liberty is one that
secures for states power to act (or not to act, if that is the taste of the
state residents) in areas that if left unregulated would not diminish
human liberty. The difficulty, of course, lies in defining those areas.
Were we to start afresh we might chart the contours of federal and
state power differently than did our eighteenth and nineteenth
century ancestors. However, we must begin with their allocation of
power; that is the Constitution's design. Our contemporary problem
is to interpret the constitutional allocation of federal and state power
in a fashion that maximizes human liberty. If liberty is jeopardized by
consigning federalism to the political process, federalism must be
enforced by courts. But if the discretionary federalism produced by
the political process poses no danger to liberty there is less reason for
the judiciary to enforce federalism. Part I examines this issue further.
To understand the Rehnquist Court's federalism (indeed, to
understand any federalism decisions) it is essential to understand why
federalism matters. If federalism does not matter, or if the judiciary
has no role to play in federalism, our view of the Court's work will be
vastly different than if federalism does matter and the Court has a
role to play in ensuring its existence. Accordingly, the purpose of
Part I is to explain why federalism matters and why the Court has a
role to play in maintaining federalism. American federalism was
hatched to preserve liberty. While America and its brand of
federalism has undergone considerable change since Madison's time,
the liberty-enhancing theory undergirding federalism has not lost its
vitality or relevance to our times. Part I seeks to demonstrate that
fact. Moreover, the Court has a significant role to play in preserving
liberty, a role that it must play with respect to federalism just as it
discharges similar responsibilities with respect to free speech or equal
protection. Part I also reinforces that claim.
It is against that background that the Rehnquist Court's
federalism work should be considered. Part II seeks to examine that
work in light of the benefits to liberty that are part of maintaining a
division of power between the federal and state governments. The
Rehnquist Court's federalism may also operate to preserve the
institutional balance of power within the federal government. The
Court's rejection of the idea, rooted in Katzenbach v. Morgan, ' that
Congress has power independent of the judiciary to define the
substance of Fourteenth Amendment rights, is not by itself an issue of
federalism. Indeed, the most obvious result of City of Boerne v.
23. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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Flores24 and its progeny has been the reassertion of judicial primacy in
the interpretation of the Constitution's individual liberties. But
another important effect of confining congressional power to enforce
Fourteenth Amendment rights to legislation that is remedial has been
to expand the scope of state insulation from congressional authority,
at least until and unless the Court should confer greater authority on
Congress by judicial expansion of Fourteenth Amendment rights.
These doctrinal developments, discussed at greater length in Part II,
illustrate a fusion of federalism with separation of powers.
Assessment of the Rehnquist Court's federalism requires
consideration of what it has not done as well as what it has done.
There have been no major doctrinal innovations regarding the
conditional spending power, a lacuna that is surely curious if the
Court is as hell-bent on limiting federal power as some of its critics
claim." Moreover, the Court's preemption cases reflect a lack of
sensitivity to federalism that is equally curious. To be sure, the
ostensible issue in the preemption cases is ascertainment of the
congressional intent in its legislation, but because the Court presumes
that "Congress did not intend to displace state law'26 when it
legislates in areas of traditional state authority one would think that
this rebuttable presumption against preemption would lead the Court
to interpret federal law to avoid preemption whenever possible. This,
however, is not the case. Similarly, the Court has begun to flirt with
examination of the substance of state law on the theory that a state's
resolution of its own law can impede federal constitutional rights.
This phenomenon will also be explored in Part II.
The conclusions that will be drawn in this Article are not easily
characterized along any ideological spectrum. The case for
federalism as a device to protect liberty is strong, but judicial
enforcement of meaningful limits on the commerce power or the
conditional spending power would place in doubt the validity of a
great many federal laws that have long been accepted as within the
ambit of federal power. The political cost to the Court of asserting a
24. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
25. This is perhaps most true of lay critics, of which I offer The New York Times as the
exemplar. For example, whenever the Court has delivered its opinion in any of the major
decisions discussed in this Article-Lopez, Morrison, Flores, Kimel, Garrett, to name just a
few-The New York Times has attacked the Court as a politically-motivated despoiler of
the Constitution. A reader only of the Times would think that the Rehnquist Court's
federalism lacks any connection to constitutional history or doctrine, is devoid of reason,
and is prompted only by partisan politics. As should be evident, I think this is a risible
caricature. There may well be grounds for disagreement with the Court (and I shall
register my disagreement later on) but the Times's basis of disagreement is too shallow to
merit further mention.
26. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981). See also Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,230-31 (1947).
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reformist vision of federalism-one at odds with much of the nation's
assumptions about the scope of federal power (to say nothing of
national preferences)-is certain to be considerable. While a
conscientious judge ought not render decisions solely on the basis of
an institutional cost-benefit analysis, that factor may be relevant to
determining the precise limits of judicial review of federal legislative
powers. The Court's decisions limiting congressional power to
enforce Fourteenth Amendment individual rights to remedial
legislation represent primarily a judicial claim of primacy in
interpreting the nature and scope of individual liberties. As such,
these developments are just another move along the road from
Marbury v. Madiso2 7 that leads through Cooper v. Aaron? So far,
the Rehnquist Court's decisions in this area have simply produced
greater state insulation from accountability to private citizens, a result
that says far more about the awkwardness of Eleventh Amendment
doctrine than it does about the wisdom of denying to Congress the
power to define for itself the meaning of equal protection or due
process. Confining the congressional enforcement power to a
remedial role is an indispensable element of preserving the Court's
primary role as the interpreter of individual constitutional rights, but
the manner of the confinement raises questions about the proper
latitude that Congress should enjoy in selecting remedial devices.
Moreover, the Court has begun to signal a broader willingness to
examine state courts' resolution of issues of state law, albeit on the
claim that the state courts' resolution of such state issues raises non-
trivial issues of federal law. While that principle is surely old-hat, the
recent willingness of the Court or individual justices to examine issues
of state law to determine whether their resolution by a state's highest
court was pretextual is, if not new, at least a revival of a dormant
strain of constitutional jurisprudence. This phenomenon, too new
and too gossamer to be called a trend, does at least raise some doubts
about the fidelity of the Rehnquist Court to its commitment to the
autonomy of state governance institutions.
Finally, the work that the Rehnquist Court has not done-limiting
the scope of the conditional spending power and taking its own
preemption doctrine seriously-requires further qualification of any
assessment of its federalism. Surely this is an unfinished work, and its
present development is not entirely coherent. On one hand the Court
has begun, however tentatively, to reassert meaningful judicial review
of the commerce power, the principal source of federal legislative
authority. But the Court has eschewed any heightened review of the
conditional spending power, the principal alternative to the
27. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
28. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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commerce power and a powerful weapon with which to interfere with
the autonomous governance of states. To compound the problem the
Rehnquist Court has acted as if federalism has nothing to say about
preemption, despite the fact that its own doctrine incorporates a
federalism principle in the form of the presumption against
preemption.
In short, the Rehnquist Court is not yet engaged in an ambitious
attempt to remake federalism in the vision of a localist system of
muscular states and a puny federal government. Its federalism is an
oddly dissonant score written in different keys, entirely missing in
some places, and unintelligible in others. It is more a guidebook than
a rule book, and even then it is sufficiently confusing, inconsistent,
and contradictory that it may not prove to be a very reliable
guidebook. It is not easy to harmonize these dissonant chords and
the Court shows no inclination to do so; perhaps it thinks it has no
reason to do so.
I. The Value of Federalism
Federalism, our "oldest question of constitutional law"'
according to Justice O'Connor, has always posed two major threshold
issues: What values does (and should) federalism foster? Are those
values, whatever they are, best achieved by judicial enforcement or
through the political process alone? Though these questions are
surely capable of independent analysis and separate treatment, in
practice they are often fused together, thus making it more difficult to
answer either question.
Federalism is often claimed to serve many diverse values. It
"increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic
processes, "3 will better satisfy citizen preferences by catering to tastes
at a state level," provides citizens with the option of moving to a state
with public policies perceived to be more congenial,32 enables states to
29. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
30. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,458 (1991).
31. See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1484, 1493-94 (1987) [hereinafter McConnell, Federalism]. In the words of
the Supreme Court, the decentralized policy making that results from federalism "will be
more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society." Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458.
32. The exit option value of federalism is articulated best by economist Charles
Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956), who argued
that individual jurisdictions (states in our federal system) will offer various packages of
taxation and public expenditures that will induce citizens to locate in the state that most
closely approximates their own utility function. One can broaden the concept to non-
economic public policies as well (e.g., regulation of guns or smokers, motorcycle helmet
laws, or laws protecting or punishing minority sexual behavior). The exit option value of
federalism is popular among contemporary legal economists. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER,
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experiment with innovative public policies,3 3 preserves a government
structure that inhibits a potentially tyrannical concentration of power
in the central government,' insures the continuance of discrete
political and social communities,3 s and ensures clear political
accountability for government actors in each of the central and state
governments.3 ' Federalism is not, of course, an unqualified boon. It
can lead to the imposition of negative externalities37 and economic
inefficiency. And, of course, federalism has no place with respect to
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 635-49 (4th ed. 1992); Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights
Under Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 149 (1992).
33. The classic expression of this value is by Justice Brandeis:
It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory, and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. This Court has the
power to prevent an experiment [so] we must ever be on our guard, lest we erect
our prejudices into legal principles.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also,
Charles Fried, Federalism-Why Should We Care?, 6 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1982);
Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L.
REv. 847,854-55 (1979).
34. See, e.g., Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of
Federalism after Garcia, 1985 SUP. Cr. REV. 341, 389 ("[P]recisely because the states are
governmental bodies that break the national authorities' monopoly on coercion [they]
constitute the most fundamental bastion against a successful conversion of the federal
government into a vehicle of the worst kind of oppression.").
35. See, e.g., Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic
Minorities, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 615 (1992); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and
Federalism, 96 Yale LJ. 1425 (1987); Rapaczynski, supra note 34.
36. This claim is made mostly with respect to central government initiatives that have
the effect of forcing state legislators or executives to act in a fashion prescribed by the
central government, thus subjecting those state actors to political accountability for actions
that were not voluntary and enabling the federal legislators who dictated those actions to
avoid accountability for their policy choices. See Printz v. United States 521 U.S. 898
(1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
37. The problem can occur in almost any area, but the easiest example is
environmental pollution, where it is plainly not in the interest of an upwind state to
proscribe dirty fuels when the pollution costs of the practice are borne far more heavily by
downwind states. The result is the American experience of northeastern acid rain
produced by mid-western coal-fired power generation facilities.
38. Consider the added costs of conforming to individual state rules concerning
distribution of alcoholic beverages, a condition enshrined in the Constitution's federalism
design through the Twenty-first Amendment. Consider the additional costs of auto
manufacturer compliance with special pollution rules imposed by California, or the
increased costs to consumers of regional rules regarding reformulated gasoline that
prevent amelioration of short supplies in those regions by importation of excess gasoline
from other regions. Of course, these examples are not pure federalism examples because
they derive from federally mandated decentralization written into federal environmental
law. The principle, however, is the same. These problems can arise in almost any area of
life. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuck, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable
Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992) (arguing
that state competition to provide pro-manager corporate laws decreases shareholder
January 2002] FEDERALISM
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individual rights secured by the Constitution. Even the most ardent
advocate of federalism rejects the idea that states should be free to
ignore or undercut constitutionally guaranteed individual liberties.
The positive values of federalism can be sorted into three general
categories, each with a distinctive value: individual liberty, collective
autonomy, and political accountability. Individual liberty, as used
here, means the freedom of individuals to make choices about their
lives without government interference. Of course, none of us have
complete liberty, and only the most misanthropic anarchists among us
would long for complete liberty. The relevant question is whether
federalism increases individual liberty at the margin. Collective
autonomy describes a different liberty, the freedom of the people of a
state, acting collectively, to adopt public policies that suit them even
though such policies are at odds with national preferences or the
preferences of other states. Political accountability is simply the
process by which a democratic representative government maintains
its legitimacy-structures by which the governmental agents are held
responsible to their principals, the people. Accountability maintains
democratic legitimacy when political actors are responsible for their
own voluntary actions but distorts legitimacy when political actors are
held liable for actions over which they have no control and have had
no hand in shaping.
Individual liberty is enhanced by federalism's preservation of an
exit option and by its structural prophylactic role of preventing undue
concentration of governmental power. Collective autonomy is
fostered by federalism's ability to maximize aggregation of citizen
preferences, encourage experimentation, and preserve community.
Two of these federalism values-maximizing the satisfaction of
citizen preferences and preserving community-also serve in a
subsidiary way to augment individual liberty. Political accountability
is preserved by federalism's role in promoting greater citizen
participation and by preserving clear lines of accountability. Each of
these three groups will be examined below.
A. Individual Liberty: Exit Options and Thwarting Tyranny
(1) Exit Options
As befits a nation created by people leaving old surroundings for
new, American life has always been dominated by a intensely felt
sense of new possibilities, new beginnings. Some of this may be the
stuff of myth, but some of it has surely been reality. The ability to
wealth); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (arguing that state efforts to provide pro-manager corporate laws
undercut legitimate regulation by producing a "race to the bottom").
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move to a new locale is one part of that vision, and of course that
individual liberty, in the form of the right of interstate migration, is
constitutionally recognized. 9 There are myriad reasons why a person
might exercise this right, and selection of a different legal regime may
not be the dominant motivating factor for most people.
Indeed, as critics have pointed out, the transaction costs of
relocation are apt to overwhelm the utility gains,40 but this assumes
that utility gains are largely measured by the economic benefits of
lower taxation, the receipt of greater public expenditures, or some
unlikely combination of the two, in the new locale. Utility is not
exclusively economic, however. It is hard to measure the subjective
utility to a chain smoker of a relocation from California, where it is
virtually illegal to smoke in public, to North Carolina, where tobacco
use is, if not celebrated, at least tolerated more readily than in
California. The same might be said of a gun owner who chooses to
relocate from Massachusetts, where hand guns are virtually illegal, to
Texas or Florida, where a law abiding citizen can openly carry such
weapons. Who is to say with confidence that the smoker, or the
citizen worried about the ability to defend himself from crime
(perhaps overly worried, but isn't that for him to assess?) has paid too
high a price in relocation costs for the utility gains that come from his
newly acquired liberty to smoke or carry a firearm in public?
The fact that the exit option may rarely be exercised in its pure
form-solely in order to live in a different legal system-does not
drain it of significance. People move for a variety of reasons, and for
multiple reasons. A more desirable legal regime may well be an
element in many relocation decisions. The population boom
experienced by southern New Hampshire, for example, is no doubt
the product of many reasons, but one of them is surely the
recognition that New Hampshire offers a legal regime of lower taxes,
lesser public services, and less regulation than does neighboring
Massachusetts. Moreover, even if the pure exit option is very rarely
exercised, its possibility is an important aspect of individual liberty.
This is seen most clearly by considering the "liberty value" of rights
39. The first clear recognition of the right was in Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wail.)
35 (1867) (implied by constitutional structure), but the right has continued to be
recognized under various parts of the Constitution, in Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160
(1941) (commerce clause); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (equal protection);
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (equal protection, although Justice O'Connor,
concurring, urged that the basis of decision be the privileges and immunities clause of Art.
IV, §2); and Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (splitting the right of migration into three
components, grounded in the privileges and immunities clauses of Art. IV and the
Fourteenth Amendment, the commerce clause, and perhaps as an unenumerated implicit
right).
40. See, e.g., James M. Buchanan and Charles J. Goetz, Efficiency Limits of Fiscal
Mobility: An Assessment of the Tiebout Model, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 25 (1972).
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that may rarely be exercised. A woman may go through life never
desiring to terminate a pregnancy but that does not mean that the
constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy is of no significance to
her. Most people are never charged with a crime, but that does not
mean that the right to counsel, or the privilege against self-
incrimination, or the presumption of innocence, are of no
consequence to those of us who are not criminal defendants.
We recognize, as a staple of our individual rights jurisprudence,
that such rights are redeemable by individuals, one at a time. The
constitutional rights of criminal defendants are the clearest example,
but even with respect to equal protection, where the concept of a
"group right" may be at its strongest, the Court declares these rights
to be held by individuals. In United States v. Virginia,' for example,
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, made it clear that so long as
"some women" qualified for VMI the equal protection guarantee was
enforceable by them.42 This is not radical doctrine; constitutional
rights are individual possessions. The exit option preserved by
federalism is as much an individual right as any other. To state it as
the right to migrate is only to phrase it in the recognized vernacular of
constitutional individual liberties. Transposed to the structural
language of federalism the right is deeper: the right to be able to
choose among differing visions of public policy, the right to choose a
meaningfully different polity without abandoning one's country of
citizenship. To be sure, the exit option right is only made real by the
collective action of differing state polities, and no individual can be
sure that a state will enact his particular vision of legal paradise, but if
the central government thoroughly eliminates the possibility of such
collective action by vigorous and sweeping national legislation that
imposes a policy uniformity on the nation, the exit option is reduced
to little more than a change of license plates and driver's licenses. As
with any other individual right, it is unacceptable to entrust its
enforcement to the very political body that has the power to decide
whether or not to eviscerate the right. This right is not just a "state's
right;" it is an individual right and must be protected by courts pari
passu with all other individual constitutional rights.
Of course, the exit option insight is not limited to migration
between states. A more meaningful exit option would be one that
makes a wide variety of legal regimes available at the level of
municipalities. Variation in the package of taxes, public services, and
regulations that compose legal regimes would reduce the undeniable
41. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
42. "State actors controlling gates to opportunity" may not "exclude qualified
individuals based on 'fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and
females."' Id. at 517 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,725 (1982)).
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transaction costs of relocation and thus make the utility gains of the
exit option more widely accessible. Federalism, however, operates
only at the state level. It may be unfortunate that we lack a federal
constitutional mechanism for ensuring the power of municipalities to
produce variable legal regimes, but under our system that is the
responsibility of state citizens in constructing their state constitutions.
Although many states do provide some limited autonomy to
municipalities no state has seen fit to arrange the state as a federal
system, guaranteeing an exit option within the state. Perhaps it is
time for a state to do so, which would be an exercise in collective
autonomy that would also serve as a fine example of experimentation.
(2) Thwarting Tyranny
Federalism also advances individual liberty by thwarting the
possibility of a tyrannical central authority. Though it is not likely
that the American central government is in any danger of capture by
authoritarian forces, there is no reason to be smugly complacent.
America is not immune to the catastrophes that have befallen other
democracies. Federalism was no barrier to Hitler's usurpation of
democratic authority in Weimar Germany, and American federalism
might prove to be equally flimsy protection against an American
caudillo. In any event, the improbability of an American Stalin or
Franco is no reason to dismiss altogether the value of federalism as a
device to prevent lesser degrees of tyranny from being imposed by
the central government.
Concentration of political power-the power to make binding
public policy-can take several forms, but two possibilities are most
relevant to this discussion. The central government could either
dictate state policies or eliminate state power to set any policies at all.
The former occurs when the central government "commandeers" a
state's legislative or executive functions by compelling them to
perform federally mandated actions. Such commandeering will be
discussed in more detail in the next subsection, as it raises issues of
collective autonomy. For now, note that commandeering enables the
central government to employ two separate governments to bear
upon the people. While the policies yoked to this dual enforcement
mechanism may be benign, the mechanism itself is dangerous, for it
permits an unscrupulous wielder of power at the center not only to
ensure that no state will in any way subvert the centrally mandated
edict but also employs the states as the federal police. The other
method of concentrating political power is to eliminate the states'
ability to set independent policies. The standard and entirely
legitimate method of doing so is for Congress to use its valid
constitutional powers to preempt state authority. Two issues are
raised by this method. One is the question of the scope of the
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enumerated powers of Congress. If those powers are like the
universe, ever-expanding to infinity, the entire concept of federalism
is, to quote John Marshall in a different context, an "absurd
attempt.., to limit a power, in its own nature illimitable." 43 The
other issue is the manner in which courts determine whether
Congress has intended to preempt state power. For concentration of
power at the center to be checked effectively it is important that these
issues be taken seriously. Individual liberty might still flourish if the
federal government calls the tune to which state legislatures and
executives must dance and legislatively preempts the entire field of
human activity, but it would flourish by the grace of that central
authority. It is that possibility that prompted Professor Rapaczynski
to remark that the states "constitute the most fundamental bastion
against a successful conversion of the federal government into a
vehicle of the worst kind of oppression.", The continued existence of
states possessed of independent power to set policy is a structural
aspect of individual liberty and, as with other guarantees of individual
liberty, the courts have an important role in maintaining this
structural framework of individual liberty. Even without a present
showing of the imminent prospect of centralized tyranny the courts
surely must act to preserve the structure that keeps the prospect of
oppression distant and unthinkable. The Rehnquist Court's record
on all of these issues will be examined in detail in Part II. For now, it
is enough to note that the Court has hardly been a model of
consistency.
B. Coliective Autonomy: Maximizing Satisfaction of Citizen Preferences,
Experimentation, and Community
(1) Citizen Preferences
It is trite but true to note that our individuality is inextricable
from our social relationships. The federalism version of this truism is
the aspect of human liberty that is served by permitting the people of
each state the freedom to make diverse policy choices, so long as
those choices do not impair constitutional rights uniformly
guaranteed to all Americans. This entails the freedom to choose
policy ends, not just the freedom to select the means to reach a
common, nationally shared objective. The difference may readily be
seen by considering the arguments of some federalism proponents
that federalism promotes economic efficiency by enabling states to
compete for desirable assets-educated, productive people or clean,
43. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,177 (1803).
44. Rapaczynski, supra note 34, at 389.
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profitable employers-by tailoring their public policies to induce
those assets to locate within the state." If states set policies that
conduce to such a universally shared and efficient outcome they are
engaging in a means-based federalism. While that is one facet of
federalism,46 it is quite different from an ends-based federalism. If
California chooses to set policies that encourage leisure, hedonism,
and strongly egalitarian redistribution of wealth through the political
system, and Utah acts to encourage work, thrift, and self-reliance by
eschewing political wealth redistribution, the two states are engaging
in a distinctly ends-based federalism. But if California acts to induce
smart computer entrepreneurs to locate there by fashioning a
combination of tax breaks and state-subsidized housing for computer
employees, and Utah seeks the same end by increasing its public
expenditures on education and transportation, the two states are
engaging in means-based federalism.
It is quite likely that much of American federalism is in fact
conducted at the means-based level, but it is error to reason from that
fact (if it is fact) to conclude that Congress should have virtually
unreviewable authority to decide whether Congress may foreclose the
states from employing their chosen means to a common end. Of
course, Congress does have power to limit the means selected by
states, via such sources as the commerce, conditional spending, and
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers, and I make no
argument to the contrary. My point is that the fact that the states may
be selecting differing means to achieve a nationally shared goal is not,
by itself, a convincing reason for allowing Congress carte blanche to
define the scope of its own powers used to control states' selection of
means. The fallacy in the contrary line of reasoning is an
unarticulated assumption that nationally shared goals should be
prescribed by Congress and that, accordingly, Congress should
determine the means available to states to attain that goal. But
nationally shared goals are as apt to be the product of cultural
45. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare:
Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CoRp. L. 540, 543-53 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook and
Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. L. & ECON. 395,408-15 (1983).
46. Rubin and Feeley argue that a means-based federalism is not really federalism at
all. They note that a common goal (such as efficiency) can as readily be achieved by a
delegation to the states from the central government of the authority to employ
independent means to achieve this goal. While that is true, it does not detract from the
fact that preservation of states' independent authority to set ends necessarily preserves a
lesser included power to use differing means to achieve a widely-shared (albeit not
mandated) objective. What Rubin and Feeley call decentralization (as opposed to
federalism) is, at least in this case, a second-order federalism, a federalism of varying
means rather than varying ends. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 20, at 920-923.
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attitudes as congressional prescription47 and preservation of the
ability to reach national consensus on goals through cultural
evolution rather than law is but another facet of collective autonomy
and individual liberty.
However important a role federalism plays in preserving means-
based policy autonomy, its role is equally great in preserving ends-
based policy autonomy. This preserves not just the ability of
California, if it desires, to permit nudity on public beaches and of
Alabama to ban such behavior, but also the ability of Massachusetts,
should it wish, to create cradle-to-grave social welfare benefits
through very high taxation and of Texas to lower taxes and eliminate
the social welfare state insofar as it may. It is true that in practice we
do not observe such wildly variant choices, but this raises the question
of whether that is due to the existence of a national political culture
that eliminates the desire for such policy variance or whether policy
variations are inhibited by other factors, such as the continued
existence of exit options or the ever-increasing scope of policy
mandates from Congress. But it is undeniable that federalism
operates to preserve the possibility of such choices, and the very fact
of their possibility increases the quantum of collective autonomy that
is possessed by the citizens of a state polity. Whether they choose to
exercise their autonomy is an entirely different matter, and the failure
of exercise is hardly a reason to conclude that Congress should be
free of judicial oversight when it acts to foreclose future exercises in
collective autonomy.
As Michael McConnell has demonstrated,43 citizen preferences
are aggregated in a manner that enhances overall utility when states
are left free to pursue disparate policies. The point is seen most
clearly with respect to ends-based policy autonomy. For simplicity's
sake, imagine a nation composed of two states, Scylla and Charybdis,
each with ten million citizens. If 70% of the citizens of Scylla prefer
legal marijuana and 80% of the citizens of Charybdis prefer to
prohibit the drug, the different preferences of the citizens of these
two states will be maximized by preserving their right to set policy
independently. Seven million Scyllans and eight million Charybdians
will be satisfied; only five million citizens of the two states Will be
disappointed. The preference satisfaction rate is 75%. But if the
same issue were to be decided by a national plebiscite, marijuana
47. See, e.g., Bible Belt Couples "Put Asunder" More, Despite New Efforts, N.Y.
TIMES, May 21, 2001, at Al (detailing the efforts of states to cut the divorce rate through a
combination of pre-marital education, subsidized marriage counseling, and alteration of
laws governing marriage, and asserting that there exists "a strong national consensus that
the social ills caused by divorce are costing the federal and state governments huge
amounts of money.").
48. McConnell, Federalism, supra note 31.
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would be banned nationally and only eleven million citizens would be
satisfied, a preference satisfaction rate of 55%. Obviously, this simple
example assumes perfect expression in law of citizen preferences and
takes no account of the skewing effects of representative democracy,
especially the American system of senatorial representation. Nor
does it account for the possible increase in utility that might result
from exercise of the exit option. What this example does reveal,
however, is that collective autonomy is very likely to result in better
aggregation of citizen preferences than would the manufacture of
policy exclusively at the central level.
Collective autonomy is a close cousin to individual liberty. The
citizens who compose each state have common geographic and
cultural interests, mutual and interdependent economic interests, a
distinct interest in controlling the processes of their governance
wvithin their state, and an interest in preserving some zone of
regulatory control over their community. Even if the interests of
Iowans in such matters is similar to those of Minnesotans or
Nebraskans, they are not identical. To reason that the similarity of
interests of these midwesterners justifies an unreviewable authority in
Congress to set policy on every matter about which they may be
similarly interested is not so different from contending that, because
all Democrats possess similar though not identical interests in
political speech a majority of Democrats should determine the extent
of the political speech rights of all Democrats. Nobody would
contend that limits on the political speech of all Democrats imposed
by a majority of Democrats should escape judicial scrutiny, even
though such limits might be acceptable, even desirable, to the
overwhelming majority of Democrats. The fact that Congress might
act in a fashion that generally suits Iowans, Minnesotans, and
Nebraskans is no more forceful a justification for congressional action
escaping judicial review.
(2) Experimentation
The usual assumption about this aspect of collective autonomy is
that if the states experiment with different methods of, say, welfare
reform, some good ideas will emerge that may be emulated by all and
the bad ideas will be confined to a few unhappy states. When cast in
those terms experimentation is entirely a matter of means-based
policy autonomy and, if the real objective is to use the states as
laboratory rats to determine which method will best conduce to
accomplishment of a universally-shared oal, some sort of central
administration is probably necessary. 9 In this vision of
49. See, e.g., Rubin & Feeley, supra note 20, at 923-26.
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experimentation the federal government is the white-coated
laboratory scientist who designs and carries out the experiments.
Experimentation means much more than this, however.
Experimentation may embody experimentation as to ends as well as
means. Nebraska has been engaged for some time in the experiment
of a unicameral legislature. Perhaps this is as much a means to some
other end-frugality or better preference aggregation, to name only
two possibilities-as it is an end in itself. California engaged in what
proved to be a disastrous experiment in gas and electric utility
deregulation. If this was a means to the end of lower energy costs to
consumers it has now been demonstrated that it was a very poorly
calculated means, and one not likely to be emulated by others. But
perhaps the principle of deregulation is itself an end. A handful of
states engaged in the experiment of legalizing marijuana for medical
use, surely an end in itself, until the Supreme Court unanimously
curtailed that experiment in United States v. Oakland Cannabis
Buyers' Cooperative.0 It is this latter sort of experimentation, testing
new policy ends rather than tinkering with the means, that is of most
value in a federal system. Suppose that in some future day a majority
of Arizonans were to be speakers of Spanish and Arizona should
decide to deliver its public services, including education, almost
exclusively in Spanish. Arizona's embarkation upon such an
"experiment" would not be to see if Spanish is a good idea for the
country as a whole, but to cater to the aggregate preferences of
Arizonans. When viewed in this light experimentation is no different
from the earlier argument concerning maximization of citizen
preferences. The important point is that experimentation is not, as
some critics of federalism contend, entirely about states testing
different means to a common end. It is about the ability of states and
their citizens to experiment with entirely new policy objectives.
(3) Community
We form communities of many differing kinds-alumni
associations, baseball fans, veterans' groups, churches, recovering
substance abusers, dog lovers-in our endless subdivision of our
interests. But there are two forms of community that are especially
important in any consideration of federalism-cultural communities
and political communities.
Cultural communities are groups of people bound together by
shared language, ethnicity or distinctive customary behavior. French
speakers in Canada are a cultural community. Navajos and Hopis
constitute separate cultural communities within the United States.
Cuban emigres to the United States, at least to the extent that group
50. 532 U.S. 483 (2001).
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remains geographically concentrated in South Florida, are another
example. It is reasonable to ask why we might wish to preserve such
communities and, if it turns out that we do, we might wonder whether
American federalism is the best mechanism for preservation.
The argument for preservation of cultural communities is rooted
in the idea that these communities are constitutive of individual
identity. A political system that purports to value individual liberty
should wish to preserve communities that provide much of an
individual's sense of personhood. This may be true, but it might also
be said, at some risk of trivialization, that at least some people
constitute their identity by their affiliation with athletic teams. 1 The
contemporary spectacle of riotous celebration of victory in the Super
Bowl, or the NBA finals, or, even more recently, the venting of the
frustration of defeat by fans of the collegiate basketball teams of the
universities of Maryland and Arizona, surely inspire us to draw some
lines about which communities constitutive of identity are deserving
of protection. Nonetheless, the historical claims of such communities
as French speakers in Quebec, or Navajos and Hopis in America, are
of such antiquity and depth that they have a special resonance. There
is no pat formula by which to separate the deserving cultural
community from the bogus one, but the claims of language or
ethnicity are surely superior to those of more transient and less
indelible traits.
The harder question is whether American federalism is very well
suited to the preservation of cultural communities. Because such
communities are nowhere coterminous with a state polity it is not at
all clear that historically accidental state boundaries work to preserve
such communities. Indeed, inasmuch as the Amish in Pennsylvania,
Ohio, Iowa, or Wisconsin, the Navajos in Arizona and New Mexico,
or blacks or Hispanics everywhere remain in a minority position
within state polities, it might well be unrealistic to think that
federalism is utile to this end. However, to the extent that it is
thought that states will act to oppress these minorities, federalism is
not an issue. The federal constitutional guarantees of equal
protection, due process, and religious liberty are likely to be
adequate protection from blatant state misconduct. Even so, it
cannot be said that federalism will do very much to preserve the
existing distribution of cultural communities in the United States."'
51. The clearest example of this was the sad account of a thirty-something fan of the
Houston Oilers professional football team who reacted to his team's playoff defeat
sometime in the 1980s or early 1990s by committing suicide. The incident was reported in
the San Francisco Chronicle at the time but I was insufficiently morbid to preserve a
clipping.
52. There are, of course, some exceptions to this appraisal. For example, the electoral
system for presidential elections requires national candidates to pay attention to politically
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Quite the opposite would be the case, of course, if revolutionary
blandishments toward Quebec had succeeded and it were an
American state. Perhaps the admittedly remote possibility of Puerto
Rican statehood should caution us to be slow about dismissing
completely the utility of federalism for preserving cultural
communities.
Whatever role federalism plays with respect to cultural
communities it is quite capable of preserving political communities,
especially when those political communities overlap with distinct
cultural communities. The cantons of Switzerland are one such
example, so too, is the present semi-autonomous status of Quebec.
But it is frequently claimed that no American state possesses a
unique, distinctive political culture and that the American political
community is not a mosaic but one undifferentiated whole.' Political
communities are not necessarily cultural communities; they are
aggregations of people with a commonality resulting from sharing a
social and economic interdependence that is produced by geographic
proximity. This interdependence does not stop abruptly at state
borders but, within reason, regions of the nation have different
interests. New England has a concern for the price of home heating
oil that is not shared by Californians, whose anxiety about electricity
on demand is not necessarily shared by Kansans. The states of the
midwest underlying the depleted Oglalla aquifer may share an
interest in its fate that is not held by citizens of Kentucky and
Tennessee. Wyoming has an interest in mineral extraction that is
similar, but certainly not identical, to that of Montana and Colorado.
Washington, Oregon and Idaho share an interest in the fate of the
Columbia-Snake watershed but their individual interests diverge.
Not all of these interests are driven by geography. Utah has an
interest in public morality that is considerably different than that of
neighboring Nevada, and I do not think the difference inheres in
topography. It may be true that Nebraskans lack the sort of cultural
identity that Quebeckers, Catalans, or Scots may possess, but that is
not to say that Nebraska is so utterly lacking in a separate political
identity that Nebraskans' shared sense of political identity is
insignificant. It is undoubtedly true that we regard ourselves as
Americans, and only as an afterthought might we identify ourselves
as Arizonans or Floridians. But we do have an interest in the political
significant concentrations of voters in key electoral jurisdictions. This probably works to
magnify the importance of Cuban-Americans in Florida, or Jews in New York, but the
effect is at best ephemeral and the product of other political forces. In the 2000 election,
for example, Al Gore could safely rely on New York and thus neither he nor George Bush
had any particular need to display any special attention to any voters in New York,
whatever their religious affiliation.
53. See, e.g., Rubin & Feeley, supra note 20, at 944-47.
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independence of our state that is a bit larger than the design of the
state's license plate. To say that we have a national political
community is not to deny that we also belong to state political
communities. Montanans have an interest in maintaining the right to
possess a firearm that is simply not the same as that of a New
Jerseyan. The fact that New Jerseyans and Montanans belong to the
same national political community says absolutely nothing about
whether that political community, or the separate political
communities of Montana and New Jersey, should make decisions
about the extent of permissible firearms possession in Montana or
New Jersey. But the fact that the demographic, social, and cultural
conditions of Montana and New Jersey are considerably different
from each other, and different in ways that are relevant to this issue,
suggests that the separate state political communities are the
appropriate political actors. Despite the fact that our national life is
all too homogenous in certain ugly respects-the ubiquitous chain
vendors of junk food, exotic coffee, and discount merchandise, the
same panorama of broad boulevards hospitable only to autos, the
dreary collection of uninspired residential architecture clustered
together in subdivisions mandated by profit and brain-dead zoning
bureaucrats-there is no reason to celebrate this insipid homogeneity
by encouraging Congress to impose without restraint a similarly
dreary legal uniformity. It is the function of federalism to preserve at
least the possibility of difference among our political communities,
however moribund we may permit those communities to become.
C. Political Accountability: Citizen Participation and Clear Responsibility
(1) Citizen Participation
A familiar claim for federalism is that it "increases opportunity
for citizen involvement in democratic processes."' This is usually
interpreted to mean that federalism will encourage more citizen
participation in state politics as more public policies are set at the
state level. This may well be true. There are fewer barriers to such
participation-state capitals are closer to home for most people than
the District of Columbia, state legislators have fewer demands on
their time than their federal counterparts, state legislators are often
part-time politicians with some connection to real life-but there is
no assurance that these conditions produce greater citizen
participation in the democratic process.' There are, however,
54. Gregory v. Asheroft, 501 U.S. 452,458 (1991).
55. Some argue that fostering public participation in politics at the state level is hardly
a good thing and ought not be uncritically encouraged. This argument usually centers on
the contention that state polities are apt to be insensitive to minorities in their midst as, of
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additional ways in which federalism promotes political accountability
through citizen participation.
The organized citizens' lobby is a paradox of citizen
participation. Whether the lobbyist be the National Rifle Association
or Defenders of Wildlife, People for the American Way or the Center
for Individual Rights, the AARP or Common Cause, they represent
the focused energies of citizens. But in the course of focusing those
energies and views such lobbies tend to acquire an independent voice
and mind, posing some risk that they do not accurately reflect the
sentiments of the citizens they purport to represent. In a centralized
system it is far easier for these groups to exert pressure on 535
members of Congress, all conveniently located on Capitol Hill, than
to organize fifty separate branch agencies, each charged with the task
of lobbying a separate set of state legislators. A robust federalism
makes lobbying harder, more uncertain, more expensive, and less
effective. To the extent that lobbying, a "representative" form of
citizen participation, is thought to be inferior to unmediated citizen
involvement, federalism decreases the power of lobbying and at least
creates opportunities for direct citizen participation in the creation of
public policy. Whether those opportunities are seized is left to the
citizenry; federalism's role is simply to create the opportunities.
Another avenue of citizen participation promoted by federalism
is the ability of state citizens to create differing mechanisms for
selection of their governmental agents. Of course, this power is
limited by the federal Constitution, particularly the equal protection
and guaranty clauses. For much of our history states were free to
compose representative government on the basis of a wide variety of
factors, but with Reynolds v. Sims"6 and its progeny this power has
been greatly constricted. It may be unfortunate that the Court
ignored the value of federalism in creating its equal protection
jurisprudence, but it has done so and there is no prospect for a revival
of federalism in this area. But other possibilities remain. There is no
course, American states were during the oppressive Jim Crow century after the Civil War.
See, e.g., Rubin & Feeley, supra note 20, at 915-17. But there is no reason to think that
state polities are monolithically reactionary. Minnesota's experimentation with socialist
policies during the Great Depression is one contrary example, and contemporary
initiatives legalizing physician-assisted suicide or medical marijuana use are additional
examples. Oregon voters enacted legislation permitting physician assisted suicide. See
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800 et seq (1996). Alaska, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine,
Nevada, Oregon, and Washington have enacted laws permitting medical use of marijuana.
See ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.71.090, 17.37.010-.080 (Michie 2000); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2001); COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14; HAW. REV. STAT. §§
329-121 to 329-128 (2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2383-B(5) (West 2000); NEV.
CONST. art. 4, § 38; OR. REV. STAT. §§ 475.300-475.346 (1999); WASH. REV. CODE §§
69.51A.005-69.51A.902 (1997 & Supp. 2000-2001).
56. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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barrier to a state's adoption of a parliamentary system of government,
for example, and there are decided advantages to a parliamentary
system. A state could create electoral districts with small numbers of
electors, somewhat like New Hampshire's large House of
Representatives, and the nature of a parliamentary system would
encourage civic participation in each such election because elections
for members of parliament become the indispensable avenue for
influencing the policy direction of the resulting government. A state
could combine parliamentary government with proportional
representation, thereby ensuring Italian-style revolving-door
governments, but increasing the incentive for citizens to participate in
parliamentary elections as voters, campaign workers, and public
speakers. None of these things will ever happen at the federal level.
Ensuring the possibility of their occurrence at the state level is one
value of federalism.
(2) Clear Lines of Accountability
Political accountability is fostered not only by enhanced citizen
participation in existing political processes and the creation of new
processes but also by ensuring that government actors are clearly
exposed to public reckoning for their own choices and shielding them
from responsibility for policy choices that are not of their doing. The
Court's method of doing so has been the creation of the "anti-
commandeering" principle, by which Congress is deprived of power
to compel states to enact federally prescribed legislation 7 or to
administer federal regulatory programs.' This principle is a
procedural device, specifying a particular impermissible method of
federal regulatory control. Because federal systems are composed of
two separate units of government, each independently responsible to
the people, it is essential that federalism principles promote accurate
political accountability for legislation, provide adequate notice to
citizens of pending policy choices, and foster opportunity to comment
upon and to influence those choices.
It may be that voters, or at least some voters, are intelligent
enough to recognize which government is the source of a particular
policy that is irksome or delightful and that there is thus no need for
the anti-commandeering principle. But there are other aspects of
accountability at work here. Federal dictation of the content of state
legislation would strip state legislators of autonomy; they would be
literally "puppets of a ventriloquist Congress."59 While puppet service
might not take up too much legislative time (assuming that Congress
57. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
58. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
59. Brown v. EPA, 521 F. 2d 827,839 (9th Cir. 1975).
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were to pull the puppet strings sparingly) it would sap state legislators
of independent judgment, not simply because of the sheer puppetry
but also because legislative mandates would eliminate the state's
ability to consider other options. As a result, even though citizens
may be fully aware that their state legislators were merely performing
federally mandated tasks, they would be unable to assess their
legislators on the basis of how they exercised independent judgment.
A different interference with accountability occurs with respect
to administrative mandates. There is only so much time, and to the
extent a state executive official is assigned federal administrative
tasks he is rendered less able to execute state law. Or, even if time is
effectively expanded by the addition of personnel, a state's legislative
priorities are set by Congress, whether or not it explicitly demands
the increased state taxes and expenditures necessary to discharge the
federal mandate. Moreover, the interference with accountability is
not limited to state officials. As Justice Scalia noted in Printz, the
President's constitutionally assigned power and responsibility to
execute federal law "would be shattered, and.., subject to
reduction.., by simply requiring state officers to execute its laws."'
State officials are simply not accountable to the President; it is
beyond the power and duty of the President to supervise the
administration of federal laws executed by state officials.
D. The Value of Federalism and the Judicial Role
Whether these values can best be attained by principal (or
exclusive) reliance upon the courts or the political process is a mixed
question of political theory and constitutional interpretation, and the
dividing line between the two modes of thought is not easy to discern.
Is it constitutional interpretation or political theory to claim, as did
Justice Blackmun in Garcia, that "the principal means chosen by the
Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal system lies in
the structure of the Federal Government itself?"6  Surely the
structure of the federal government is a matter of constitutional text,
but the question of whether the limits on federal power imposed by
that structure are to be determined by the Court or the Congress is
not squarely answered by text. While it might be a reasonable
inference that the answer is to be found in constitutional
interpretation, in fact political theorists and constitutional
interpreters have vied to provide the answer.62 Judicial review is, of
60. 521 U.S. at 923.
61. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,550 (1985).
62. The most important defenses of politically enforceable federalism are arguments
based on political theory. See, e.g., JOHN ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980);
JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980);
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course, an implied power but it is so deeply imbedded in our
constitutional culture that it will not depart, and the limits of federal
power are plainly expressed (albeit in general terms) in the
paramount law that the Court claims is its "emphatic" duty to
interpret. Equally true is the proposition that the Constitution must
be interpreted not to defeat the venture in self-government it
launched, and if judicial enforcement of federalism produces
politically untenable outcomes that act on the polity like suppressed
tectonic forces (as may have been the case prior to the 1937
constitutional revolution), deference to the political branches may be
as much sound constitutional interpretation as it is political theory.
Nevertheless, there are sound reasons for insisting that the
judiciary play a role in policing the Constitution's allocation of power
between the federal and state governments. These reasons are
historical, structural, and prudential. While none of them, considered
individually, absolutely crush the arguments for politically
enforceable federalism, taken together they make a convincing case
for an active judicial role in enforcing federalism.
The historical case for judicially enforceable federalism is best
presented by John Yoo in his cleverly titled article, The Judicial
Safeguards of Federalism,6 and the best attack upon that historical
reading is Larry Kramer's article, Putting the Politics Back into the
Political Safeguards of Federalism.A Professors Yoo and Kramer
agree that American federalism is rooted deeply in the colonial
experience, but each draws different conclusions. Yoo argues,
predictably enough, that the Revolution was triggered by
Parliament's attempt to withdraw autonomous governance from the
colonies in the form of control over taxation of American colonists
and that the colonial conception of equality between colonial
assemblies and Parliament was a fundamental stage upon which the
ratification debates were played.' In the course of the ratification
debates, Anti-Federalists attacked the proposed Constitution as a
vehicle for annihilating the states 6 and Federalists responded with an
expressio unius argument-the enumeration of limited powers
assigned to the central government was adequate protection for state
autonomy-and with an early version of politically enforceable
federalism, arguing that the very composition of the central
Kramer, supra note 14; Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The
Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
63. See Yoo, supra note 16.
64. See Kramer, supra note 14.
65. Yoo, supra note 16, at 1364.
66. Id. at 1375-77.
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government would be entirely owing to the states.67 But these
arguments were not effective. Anti-Federalists pointed to ancient
Rome and political man's natural hunger for power to contend that
political safeguards were no safeguards at all.6 The wisest fox ever to
exist might be given to understand that if he eats all the hens in the
coop he may have no supper on the morrow, and that his faithful
guarding of the hens from wolverines will be rewarded by a hen per
day, but it is not in the nature of the fox to forebear his grisly
pleasure. As with foxes, so with politicians, except that foxes may be
more charming and trustworthy. At any rate, in Yoo's account the
Federalists realized the losing nature of their political safeguards
argument and began to champion judicial review as the ultimate
check upon the expansion of federal power with consequent
diminution of state autonomy.69 Yoo summarizes these developments
be declaring that the "historical evidence.., shows an understanding
among the leading ratifiers that while the national political process
may have been the primary safeguard of federalism, it was not the
exclusive safeguard of federalism."70
Professor Kramer agrees that the Revolution was spawned by
Britain's shrinking of the scope of colonial self-government, but
argues that the lesson drawn from that experience by Americans was
that republican politics-popular sentiment, either manifested
directly or through democratically elected representatives-was
sufficient to check an overly greedy central government. He relies
upon the tenuous nature of judicial review in revolutionary America
to support the inference that it was unlikely that the Founders would
have relied on the judiciary as the principal check upon a pretentious
central government.7' But Kramer fails to mention such pivotal
colonial events as the Writs of Assistance Case, in which James Otis
Jr. argued strongly for the judiciary-and a colonial judiciary-as the
check upon the grasping pretensions of the imperial Parliament.73 To
be sure, the Writs of Assistance Case is an isolated event, but its
importance to American political thought of the era was vastly
greater than its singularity might suggest. John Adams later declared
that it was at that moment that the child Independence was born.74
Adams may have been indulging in hyperbole but his statement is no
less important for that. The colonial generation was perfectly willing
67. Id. at 1377-80.
68. Id. at 1381-82.
69. Id. at 1383-89.
70. Id. at 1391.
71. Kramer, supra notel4, at 236-38.
72. Id. at 238-242.
73. See M. H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE (1978).
74. Id. at 7.
[Vol. 53
FEDERALISM
to seek to enforce its localist vision of federalism by ordinary politics,
revolutionary politics, and war. Is it any surprise that they were also
willing to enlist the judiciary in the crusade?
More central to Kramer's argument is the contention that "in all
the flood of pamphlets and essays and editorials that poured from the
presses.., and in all the voluminous records of debate in the state
ratifying conventions, there is only [a] smattering of references to
courts and judicial review. ' 5 Kramer thinks the paucity of arguments
in the ratification debates for judicial review as a mechanism of
curbing federal power and preserving state autonomy is "completely
understandable given the immature state of the law respecting
judicial review and its limited role at the time..., [and] it utterly
discredits any notion that federal courts were an important element of
the design to protect state sovereignty."76 But Kramer has missed
much of the nuance of the ratification argument. The statements
cited by Kramer-familiar comments of James Wilson, John
Marshall, Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No. 78, and less
familiar ones by Oliver Ellsworth and John Stevens-were all uttered
in the context of a debate that had grown increasingly more difficult
for the Federalist defenders of the proposed Constitution. The
Federalists had failed to persuade with either their expressio unius
argument or their political safeguards argument. Calls for a Bill of
Rights were ringing in the ratifying conventions, and because
individual liberty and government power were perceived as two sides
of the same coin, the demands for a Bill of Rights were demands for
written, enforceable constitutional guarantees of limits upon federal
power. It is only later generations of Americans that have bifurcated
individual rights and government powers, treating the former as
trump cards to be played upon the latter. The founding generation
did not see it that way-individual liberty inhered in the absence of
government power and the Bill of Rights was all about adding
additional checks on power. It is thus no accident that the Bill of
Rights included two structural checks on federal power, the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments. Thus, when Federalists belatedly started to
offer the courts as the defenders of state autonomy they were
engaged in a rear-guard action of sorts, one designed to gain
ratification by offering the courts as well as the political process as the
agents of federalism.
In a sense, none of this should be surprising. As Kramer
accurately notes, it is "old news" that "judicial review received
scarcely any attention at the Federal Convention," and it is equally
75. Kramer, supra note 14, at 252.
76. Id.
77. Id at 242.
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old news that the role of judicial review remained unsettled until the
Marshall Court made the claim that stuck. It is thus not surprising
that even though the ratification debates centered on the scope of
federal power not very much was made of judicial review as a pivotal
element in restraining that power. Nor should we be surprised by the
lack of specific mention of the courts as a device to restrain
congressional usurpations. Judicial review was simply not a topic of
vigorous discussion, and no amount of dissection of the record left to
us will produce anything definitive on this point. The historical
record is "almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon
to interpret for Pharaoh. [Two centuries] of partisan debate and
scholarly speculation yield[] no net result but only suppl[y] more or
less apt q uotations from respected sources on each side of any
question.""'
This does not mean, however, that history tells us nothing. We
know that the Revolution was a revolt against withdrawal of
autonomy from the colonies; we know that judicial review played a
role in the development of colonial and revolutionary thought as a
means to check legislative abuses; we know that the Framers intended
both to strengthen the central government and to ensure that its
powers were sufficiently limited to maintain significant policy
independence in the states; we know that judicial review became
firmly established little more than a decade after constitutional union
and that the very first exercise of that power was to strike down a
federal statute, albeit not one with federalism implications. Even the
most ardent advocates of politically enforceable federalism must
admit that these accepted markers of our constitutional history do not
add up to a clinching argument against any use of the courts to police
the limits of federal power.
Of course, it is true that most of the antebellum exercises of
judicial review were invocations of that power to check state
encroachments upon federal power. Apart from Gibbons v. Ogden,7"
the Court's role with respect to the commerce clause was to chart the
implicit limits placed by that clause upon state regulations of
interstate commerce. But this does not establish that it was the early
understanding of the nation that judicial review was not to be used to
check attempts by Congress to exceed its powers. To the contrary,
the exceedingly nationalist John Marshall took pains to say, in
McCulloch v. Maryland,' that if Congress, "under the pretext of
executing its powers, [should] pass laws for the accomplishment of
78. Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-35 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
79. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
80. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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objects not entrusted to the government[] it would become the
painful duty of this tribunal... to say that such an act was not the law
of the land. ' 'Sl The failure to employ judicial review in this fashion
says more about scrupulous observance by Congress of the limits
placed by the Constitution upon its powers than it does about a
supposed national consensus that judicial review was not to be used
to check congressional ventures into unauthorized territory. It should
come as no surprise to any student of American constitutional history
that the Court's use of judicial review power to control the scope of
federal power coincides with the rise of the twentieth century's
phenomena of extreme nationalism-the consolidation of national
power at the center of each megastate vying for world supremacy:
Great Britain, Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, Japan, China, and, of
course, the United States. Nor should it be terribly surprising that the
Court abandoned the effort at the apex of American power. In the
struggle for world supremacy concentration of American power at the
center was a positive good, but with the end of superpower
competition and the general worldwide devolution of political
authority to accommodate demands for regional autonomy stemming
from many different sources, the Court returned its attention to the
proper scope of federal power.
The sweep of history, as opposed to the arid accounting of quotes
preserved to us, suggests that the Framers regarded the courts as one
among several devices to control federal authority. The Court had
few occasions to exercise this power until Congress began
aggressively to grasp for substantial control of American life, but long
before this event the Court asserted that it possessed such power,
providing some confirmation of the Framers' expectation that the
Court would act to rein in Congress in the name of federalism. It is
impossible to conclude from history alone that the courts have no role
to play in preserving federalism, but it would be equally dangerous to
rely on history alone to support the proposition that the courts have
the primary responsibility for preserving state autonomy.
The structural arguments for judicially enforceable federalism
inevitably overlap with the historical arguments. Can there be any
doubt that the Framers had dual objectives in framing the
Constitution-to increase federal authority but only within carefully
defined limits calculated to preserve state autonomy? Can there be
any less doubt that the Framers' Constitution diffused federal power
among three branches and endowed each branch with powers
sufficient to check the ambitions of the other branches? Can it be
possible that such a system was designed with conscious omission of
the power of courts to arrest unauthorized exercises of federal power
81. 1L at 423.
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by either the President or Congress? Such must be the conclusion
urged by the advocates of politically enforceable federalism.
Professor Kramer, for example, makes much of the comments of
Federalists during the ratification debates to the effect that popular
politics-the sentiments of the people transmitted directly by
elections and indirectly through their representatives-would be
adequate to ensure the continued autonomy of the states. 2 No doubt
Kramer is correct to contend that the Framers expected the
"structural innovations" of the Constitution to be "merely a tool to
make possible the preservation of [liberty within] a constitutional
order," with the people supplying the "energy [and] direction to
protect liberty."' ' But that expectation does not negate the quite real
probability that the Framers expected judicial review to be one of the
tools wielded by the people's representatives to preserve liberty.
Moreover, Kramer is surely wrong to conclude that political
parties, institutions that straddle the federal-state boundary, are the
viable, if unexpected, political guardians of federalism. Kramer's
essential point is that American political parties, loosely organized
and focused primarily on the practical end of winning elections,
together with a cadre of elected and appointed federal office-holders
with roots in the states, operate to make the states and the federal
government interdependent and thus furnish a balance wheel that
regulates the scope of federal power and adequately preserves state
autonomy. In short, because neither the federal government nor the
states can do without the other, and the agents of the people in both
governments gain office through political parties, the mediating
institution of those parties ensures that state interests remain
adequately considered in policy formation. But this vision fails to
account for the power of political action committees, single issue
lobbies that are more than willing to expend money and effort to
secure the election of pliable members of Congress wherever and
whenever possible. Political parties are willing participants in this
system, vying with increasing vigor for "soft-money" for themselves
and funneling other contributions into their allied PACs.' Without
much exaggeration, the result is a Congress of members who
represent, not Alabama and California and New York and Wyoming,
but the AARP, People for the American Way, the NRA, the NEA,
the environmental lobby, the health insurance industry, and on and
82. Kramer, supra note 14, at 252-68.
83. Id. at 268.
84. The proposed campaign-finance legislation currently pending in Congress is, of
course, designed to dampen the fervor of this process. Perhaps it will do so, if it is
constitutionally valid; but the post-Watergate Federal Election Campaign Act was
supposed to do the same thing, and it is in the wake of that legislation that the present
system developed.
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on. Of course, those lobbies represent the concentrated energies of
real people, but their interests are not identified or expressed in any
manner relevant to federalism. It is wholly unrealistic to expect a
Congress of people committed to issues that have no relevance to
federalism to tarry and consider the limits of federal power as they
hasten to do the bidding of their ideological allies that put and keep
them in office. Any concern for federalism in this political process is
pure happenstance.
A political structure that no longer harmonizes in any
meaningful way with the constitutional structure is a dubious
candidate for leadership in the preservation of that constitutional
structure. Of course, if "the people... become more partial to the
federal than to the State governments ... the people ought not surely
to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where they may
discover it to be most due;""5 but Madison's immortal observation
carries with it the implication that if the people should think the
federal government has too few powers they are free to amend the
Constitution to endow it more amply. Nothing in this or any other
statement of the Framers suggests that the people's federal
representatives are free to ignore the limits on their power in order to
facilitate a transient popular fondness for the federal government as
the translator of popular will. At most, Madison's comment suggests
that the scope of federal power ought be interpreted with sufficient
flexibility to accommodate reasonable variations in taste about the
wisdom of national or local action on any given issue of policy. There
is, however, an enormous difference between flexibility and flaccidity,
a difference acutely appreciated by one whose elasticized bathing suit
waist band has suddenly lost its elasticity in mid-dive. The Court's
role is to make sure that the Constitution's elasticity of federalism is
not lost by reckless and untoward stretching of the fabric.
Moreover, because federalism's values are not purely
instrumental but are heavily laden with the burden of protecting
individual liberty, judicial review has a definite role to play. Even the
most outspoken defenders of politically enforceable federalism are
quick to agree that the Court has a pivotal role to play in preserving
individual liberty. It has no more warrant to abandon its duty when
federalism is the constitutional agent of liberty than when equal
protection is the agent of liberty.
From this may be seen the prudential role of the Court.
Prudential reasoning about the Constitution is eminently pragmatic,"
85. THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison).
86. According to PHILIP BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982), prudential
arguments about the Constitution are those that advance "particular doctrines according
to the practical wisdom of using the courts in a particular way." Id. at 7.
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and the Court's role in federalism is, or at least should be, influenced
significantly by priagmatic considerations. The best argument for
politically enforceable federalism is a prudential one-that the
Court's notions of the limits of federal power, when arrayed in
opposition to popular notions on that subject, are unstable, lacking in
endurance, and costly expenditures of the Court's institutional
political capital. But these arguments are speculation at most. The
pre-1937 Supreme Court engendered opposition, and strong
opposition at that, but it did not founder even when opposed by
perhaps the most popular American President since George
Washington, a President backed by overwhelming congressional
majorities. Nor is the Court a monolith-there is every reason to
expect that a Court severely out of step with contemporary politics
will be corrected through the appointments process. After all, by the
time Franklin Roosevelt expired, he had appointed eleven justices
and the Four Horsemen had drifted off into death and retirement.
Advocates of politically enforceable federalism argue that these
conditions, certainly lamentable even if correctable, come about
because the Court as an institution is poorly equipped to locate the
limits of federal power. Congress, it is said, is better able to marshal
the facts needed to assess whether any given issue is appropriately
within the ambit of federal power. This argument has assumed a
mantra-like quality, repeated so often that it has become a shorthand
jargon among justices and scholars. Justice Brennan, for example,
relied on the "institutional competence" of Congress as justification
for his now repudiated holding that Congress could engage in
"benign" racial discrimination so long as such racial discrimination
was substantially related to an important state objectiveY' But
Brennan never provided any persuasive illumination of the nature of
this competence, one so vast as to reduce the scrutiny to be given to
presumptively invalid racial discrimination. Congress is indeed
capable of collecting vast amounts of evidence inadmissible in
ordinary lawsuits, evidence that may be highly probative in sorting
out public problems and devising solutions to them, but that fact says
absolutely nothing about the relative ability of Congress and Court to
discern when those solutions, however admirable, transcend the
constitutional boundaries upon federal power. If the argument of
those advocating politically enforceable federalism is simply that
federal power should be large enough to enable the federal
government to act upon any perceived problem, they are not arguing
that Congress is more "competent" than the Court in surveying the
boundaries of federal power; they are arguing that the limits of
87. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 563 (1990), overruled by Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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federal power are whatever Congress chooses them to be. And that,
boiled down to the syrup, is precisely what constitutes the political
"safeguards" of federalism. This is not a pragmatic argument for
preserving the Constitution's structure of divided powers; it is an
argument for amending the Constitution without resort to Article V.
To be sure, many of those who make this argument have little
patience with Article V, and think that the Constitution may be freely
amended by "extraordinary" moments of ordinary politics,' but their
argument remains one of constitutional amendment rather than a
prudential argument about constitutional interpretation.
Consider a hypothetical federal law invoking the commerce
power to prohibit recreational hunting of deer. It is entirely possible
that a majority of citizens in some unknown number of states would
applaud such a law, and that there would be strong contrary
sentiment within a (possibly minority) number of affected states. The
ultimate question is which organ of government delineates the
frontier between federal and state power to set policy. There are
three plausible choices: the individual States, the Congress, and the
Court. Nobody proposes that the States should decide the issue, for
the obvious reason that they are not disinterested. Why, then, do we
so readily assume that the Congress is sufficiently disinterested to
decide the issue?
That said, judicially enforceable federalism does not mean that
federalism should be exclusively enforced by judges, nor does it imply
any precise standard of review to apply to judicial review of
congressional enactments. The real debate ought to be over the
standard of review. Since the New Deal, the effective level of review
of the scope of federal power has been, in the main, an extremely
deferential version of minimal scrutiny. If any legitimate objective
may be hypothesized which Congress might rationally have thought
fitted within an enumerated head of federal power, the legislation is
valid so long as it is rationally related to accomplishment of that
objective. This level of review is so gossamer that it is akin to the
translucent newly shed skin of the snake: It has the form of the snake
but none of its substance. Today's debate has come about because
the Rehnquist Court has raised the level of review, but the nature of
those changes and their utility in securing the values of federalism
remains unclear. The next section, which examines the actual
contours of the Rehnquist Court's federalism, probes this uncertain
new terrain.
88. Bruce Ackerman is probably the foremost exponent of this doctrine. See BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1995).
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H. The Rehnquist Court's Federalism
The federalism jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court has six
main facets, four of which operate, ostensibly or actually, to protect
state autonomy, and two of which detract from state autonomy. The
four autonomy enhancing features are: (1) endowing the states with a
"procedural immunity" from federal regulation under the commerce
power, (2) reducing the deference that courts pay to Congress's
determination that a given regulated activity substantially affects
interstate commerce, (3) confining the source of Congress's power to
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity to section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and (4) limiting Congress's power to
enforce the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment to remedial
legislation. The two aspects that detract from state autonomy are:
(1) a refusal to apply, in practice, the presumption against preemption
of state law, and (2) an implicit undermining of the adequate and
independent state grounds doctrine by an increased willingness of the
Court to examine the resolution of state law by a state's highest court
when such resolution is thought to be relevant to determination of a
federal issue. Each of these phenomena will be discussed below.
A. The States' "Procedural Immunity" from Commerce-Based Regulation
The unintended legacy of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority 9 was the shift of focus from the scope of the
substantive immunity promised by National League of Cities v. Usery9'
to the process of congressional regulation of the states. National
League of Cities sought to define an area of traditional sovereign
functions that could not be invaded by Congress by use of its
commerce power. When Garcia scrapped that approach it purported
to establish that the limits upon the use of the commerce power to
regulate states are only politically enforceable. Judicial review was to
be "tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national
political process"91 and such failures were conceived as limited to
instances where states were "deprived of any right to participate in
the national political process or... singled out in a way that left
[them] politically isolated and powerless."' Very quickly this was
qualified by an interpretive rule, created in Gregory v. Ashcroft:'
Because "Garcia has left... to the political process the protection of
the States against intrusive exercises of Congress's Commerce Clause
powers, we must be absolutely certain that Congress intended such an
89. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
90. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
91. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554.
92. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505,513 (1988).
93. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
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exercise. '' 94 This "absolute certainty" could only be supplied by a
clear and unequivocal statement of Congress's intent to regulate core
state functions. This "super-strong clear statement rule," as
Professors Eskridge and Frickey have characterized it,' reflected not
only the Court's view that regulation of core state functions is so
unusual that congressional intent to do so must be beyond cavil, but
also the principle, well-embedded in the implied preemption
doctrines, that federal preemption, at least in areas "traditionally
regulated by the States," is so "extraordinary" that a presumption
against such preemption applies.96
Gregory's substantive canon of interpretation, which was itself a
process-based limit on the exertion of federal power upon the states,
spawned the current "procedural immunity" enjoyed by the states.97
In New York v. United States," the Court concluded that, while
Congress surely could use its commerce power to regulate the
creation and disposal of low-level radioactive waste, it could not
simply tell the states that they must either take title to all such waste
generated within their borders (and assume the associated liabilities
of ownership) or construct a disposal facility in the manner prescribed
by the federal government. That, said the Court, was an
impermissible "commandeering" of the state power to govern itself.99
Federal commands to which state legislators must respond posed too
great a risk of loss of political accountability. °° In Printz v. United
States,1°1 the Court concluded that Congress had no commerce-based
power to require state executive officials to enforce a federal
regulatory scheme. Congress could not command local sheriffs to
conduct Brady Act background checks because that posed much the
same problem of lost or blurred political accountability, undermined
the President's exclusive power and obligation to enforce federal law,
and lacked warrant in either history or precedent. The result of
Printz and New York is that Congress "may not compel the States to
enact or administer a federal regulatory program,""0 or in the more
colorful words of the Ninth Circuit's Judge Sneed, the states may not
94. IL at 464.
95. See William Eskridge, Jr. & Philip Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 623-24 (1992).
96. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460. See also infra text accompanying notes 257-310.
97. For an earlier exploration of the procedural immunity phenomenon, see Calvin
Massey, Etiquette Tips: Some Implications of 'Process Federalism', 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 175 (1994).
98. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
99. Id. at 207 n.3.
100. Id at 169.
101. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
102. Id. at 926.
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be reduced "to puppets of a ventriloquist Congress."' 3 Note that this
is merely a constitutional etiquette manual-Congress remains free to
preempt state law by regulating state activity in common with other
activity, so long as that regulation is otherwise within the commerce
power. Thus, in Reno v. Condon," the Court sustained the validity of
a federal law forbidding most releases of drivers' license information
to the public. The law, said the Court, did not require states to enact
new law nor to administer a federal regulatory program; it merely
forbade the state, as an owner of a data base of drivers' license
information, from divulging that information to the public. The
Court refrained from declaring whether the fact that the law applied
equally to private owners of such databases was critical to its
conclusion, but hinted that it was not. As a result, the procedural
immunity of states from federal regulation under the commerce
clause appears limited to legislation that requires the states either to
enact or administer a federal program and, possibly, regulation of a
core attribute of state sovereignty that lacks a clear statement of
Congress's intent so to invade state sovereignty.
One of the more interesting aspects of this procedural immunity
is its seemingly anomalous relationship with long established doctrine
rooted in Testa v. Katt" which held that state courts must entertain
federal claims when Congress directs them to do so, at least when the
doors of the state courts are open to analogous claims based on state
law. In New York the Court distinguished Testa on the ground that,
although Testa's requirement that state courts must enforce federal
law "in a sense[] direct[s] state judges to enforce [federal law], this
sort of federal 'direction' of state judges is mandated by the text of
the Supremacy Clause, [and no] comparable constitutional provision
authorizes Congress to command state legislatures to legislate.""
The same claim was made in Printz." Justice Stevens, dissenting in
Printz, argued that the Supremacy Clause's specific reference to state
judges should not detract from the general command of the clause
that federal law trumps contrary state law."' But once Occam's razor
is applied to these opposing arguments a single dispute is revealed.
All the justices would agree that federal law is supreme; the question
is whether the federal law that commands state legislative or
103. Brown v. EPA, 521 F. 2d 827,839 (9th Cir. 1975).
104. 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
105. 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
106. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,178-79 (1992).
107. Printz, 521 U.S. at 929 (the Supremacy Clause's specific reference to state judges
"says nothing about whether state executive officers must administer federal law").
108. Id. at 968 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
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administrative action is "made in pursuance" of the Constitution1
9
The Supremacy Clause's specific reference to the binding nature of
federal law upon state judges is no help in answering that question
because the answer must depend on the judicial sense of the
structural postulates that define the boundary between the
Constitution's grant of limited, enumerated powers to the federal
government and the residual authority left in the states.
Some sense of the majority's structural postulate can be derived
from its decision in Alden v. Maine."0 After Seminole Tribe of Florida
v. Florida". held that Congress lacked authority under its Article I
powers to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity from
damages suits in federal court, employees of the state of Maine filed
suit in a Maine court seeking damages for Maine's alleged violation of
the federal Fair Labor Standards Act."' The claim was dismissed due
to Maine's sovereign immunity. In the Supreme Court the employee
plaintiffs contended that because Congress had in the FLSA
specifically authorized private suits against states in their own courts
without regard to a state's consent to such suit,"' the Supremacy
Clause required that Maine entertain their claim. The Court replied
that because "the Supremacy Clause enshrines as 'the supreme Law
of the Land' only those federal Acts that accord with the
constitutional design[, this] merely raises the uestion of whether a
law is a valid exercise of the national power."" The law was invalid
because the principle of state immunity from suit without its consent
was a pre-constitutional attribute of sovereignty that was not waived
by the states in the Constitution, either explicitly or by any
implication from the grant to the federal government of its
enumerated powers.' This conclusion was reinforced by several
109. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (establishing federal law "made in Pursuance" of the
Constitution as "the supreme Law of the Land").
110. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
111. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
112. 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1994)).
113. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b) and 203(x).
114. Alden, 527 U.S. at 731.
115. Id at 715-30. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793), which held Georgia
to be amenable to suit in federal court for damages, and the Eleventh Amendment, which
promptly reversed Chisholm, cast no doubt on this conclusion because the Court was of
the view that, by the Eleventh Amendment, "Congress acted not to change but to restore
the original constitutional design." Id. at 722. Moreover, "sovereign immunity derives not
from the Eleventh Amendment but from the structure of the original Constitution itself."
Id. at 728. The history of the constitutional convention, the ratification debates, and the
Eleventh Amendment's creation suggest that it was universally understood that the
Constitution and the Eleventh Amendment had no effect on the states' immunity from
suit in their own courts. Id. at 741-43. Also relevant to the conclusion was the total
absence of any history of federal attempts to subject states to suit in their own courts
without their consent, it. at 743-45, and a consistent judicial assumption that states enjoy
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important structural principles of federalism. The foremost principle
was the interference with a state's autonomy-its "decisionmaking
ability"n -- presented by a congressional edict that states must
entertain unconsented suits for damages:
A power to press a State's own courts into federal service to coerce
the other branches of the State... is the power first to turn the
State against itself and ultimately to commandeer the entire
political machinery of the State against its will and at the behest of
individuals....
... Private suits against nonconsenting States-especially suits
for money damages-may threaten the financial integrity of the
States....
A general federal power to authorize private suits for
money damages would place unwarranted strain on the States'
ability to govern in accordance with the will of their citizens....
[T]he allocation of scarce resources among competing needs and
interests lies at the heart of the political process.... If the principle
of representative government is to be preserved to the States, the
balance between competing interests must be reached after
deliberation by the political process established by the citizens of
the State, not by judicial decree mandated by the Federal
Government and invoked by the private citizen."7
Such a mandate would also "strike[] at the heart of the political
accountability so essential to our liberty and republican form of
government" because it would
blur not only the distinct responsibilities of the State and National
Governments but also the separate duties of the judicial and
political branches of the state governments .... A State is entitled
to order the processes of its own governance, assigning to the
political branches, rather than the courts, the responsibility for
directing the payment of debts. If Congress could displace a State's
allocation of governmental power and responsibility, the judicial
branch of the State, whose legitimacy derives from fidelity to the
law, would be compelled to assume a role.., beyond its
competence as defined by the very Constitution from which its
existence derives.
18
such immunity, id at 745-48. The Court in Alden was careful to note, however, that the
states' "immunity from private suit in their own courts" was "beyond the congressional
power to abrogate by Article I legislation." Id. at 754. Presumably, as with Eleventh
Amendment immunity, Congress may use its power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment to abrogate state sovereign immunity in its own courts. See Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
116. Alden, 527 U.S. at 750.
117. Id. at 749-51.
118. Id. at 751-52 (citations omitted).
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Moreover, said the Court, "[t]here can be no serious
contention ... that the Supremacy Clause imposes greater obligations
on state-court judges than on the [federal] Judiciary. 119 Nothing in
the Supremacy Clause suggests "that state courts may be required to
assume jurisdiction that could not be vested in the federal courts and
forms no part of the judicial power of the United States."'20  To
harken back to Testa v. Katt, the Court in essence did one of two
things: Either it read Testa as standing for the principle that the states
may not close their courts to federal claims while entertaining
analogous state claims, or the Court read Testa more broadly (as
establishing a principle that state courts must entertain federal claims
when directed by Congress to do so) and simply engrafted onto Testa
v. Katt a pre-existing latent principle that states must entertain federal
damage suits against themselves only to the extent that the state has
waived its inherent sovereign immunity.
The structural postulate at work in Alden was the procedural
immunity principle. Congress remained free to impose liability on
the states for violations of the FLSA and to enforce the states'
resulting duty by suit brought by the United States;" what Congress
could not do was to impose an enforcement mechanism that
interfered with the internal governance processes of the states.
Though in Alden, as in New York and Printz, the Court couched the
interests it protected as the autonomous governance structure of
states, in fact the Court was protecting additional interests, rooted in
collective autonomy and political accountability."
The procedural immunity principle is well-suited to realize the
important collective autonomy goals of maximizing the satisfaction of
citizen preferences, preservation of the states' ability to experiment
with different policy objectives, and protection of political
community. Sovereign immunity may be a Faustian bargain, in that
119. Id. at 752.
120. Id. at753.
121. Id. at 759. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(c), a portion of the FLSA that authorizes the
United States to do just that.
122. The constitutional locus of the procedural immunity principle is less important
than the fact that it exists. It might be attributed to the Constitution's structure-limited
and enumerated federal powers, residual state authority-or it might be located in the
structural truism of the Tenth Amendment, or it could be located in the guarantee clause,
as Professor Deborah Jones Merritt has argued, or the necessary and proper clause, as
Donald Regan has urged. All of these textual roots nurture a principle that is
indispensable to retention of federalism. See Deborah Jones Merritt, Republican
Governments and Autonomous States: A New Role for the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. COLO.
L. REV. 815 (1994); Donald Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power
and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 593 (1995). Cf
Gary Lawson and Patricia Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993).
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the citizens of a state trade off the ability to hold their governmental
agents liable to them for damages in return for lower taxes and a
greater ability to control disposition of public funds for public
objectives, but it is a bargain that citizens should be free to make.
More importantly, keeping a state's legislature free of a federal diktat
is essential to the realization of these collective autonomy goals.
Almost as important is the Printz principle that frees state
administrators from the burden of running federal programs, a
burden that leads either to a slighting of state responsibilities or the
distortion of state taxing and spending policies to satisfy federal
demands that the states, rather than the federal government,
administer federal programs.
Procedural immunity is also key to the preservation of clear lines
of political accountability. The vice of federal dictation of state policy
is not the possibility that state voters are dolts and cannot understand
that the federal government has forced their state legislators or
administrators to enact or administer federal programs, but that state
legislators and administrators are held accountable for what they did
not do. Federal control constricts the scope of independent judgment,
and such judgment inheres equally in acts of commission and
omission.
The costs of procedural immunity are negligible. Congress is
deprived only of the power to delegate to states the responsibility and
fiscal cost of enacting and administering federal dictates. Congress
remains free to enact federal regulatory schemes and to create a
federal bureaucracy to administer those programs. Moreover, the
force of procedural immunity is easily avoided by straightforward
preemption of state law," conditional preemption, or the
conditional spending power." Given the ready availability of such
123. This can be done most effectively by express preemption, although given the
laxness with which the Court has applied the substantive interpretive canon against
implied preemption one cannot safely say that express preemption is necessary to this
objective. See infra text accompanying notes 257-310.
124. This is simply legislation that expressly (or, perhaps, impliedly) preempts state law
but is suspended in the event that a state adopts the legislation as its own. An example is a
federal law forbidding possession of a firearm that has moved in interstate commerce in or
near a school, but is suspended in any state that has made possession of a gun in or near a
school a crime. To the extent this gambit should become popular with Congress it raises
some of the same difficulties as conditional spending, and may well receive a doctrinal
disposition similar to that accorded conditional spending in South Dakota v. Dole, 483
U.S. 203 (1987).
125. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). Given the size of the federal
budget and the awesome scope of federal taxation, this remains perhaps the single most
potent device by which the federal government can shape state behavior. If the Rehnquist
Court were as implacably determined to exalt state power relative to the federal
government as some of its critics seem to claim, one would think that the Court would by
now have found a handy vehicle to alter conditional spending doctrine to put teeth into
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devices, procedural immunity is simply an etiquette tip to Congress.
As a practical matter the states may (or may not) be better off with
intact governance autonomy and proliferating federal bureaucracy,
but the point of federalism has never been to protect states just
because they exist, but rather to accomplish ends that enhance
individual liberty, collective autonomy, and political accountability.
If a proliferation of federal regulation, by itself, is thought to be
menacing to liberty, the people hold the agent of correction in their
hands when they congregate at the polls. But collective autonomy
and political accountability cannot be so readily protected by popular
action. The case for the Court's creation of procedural immunity is
strongest with respect to these values of federalism.
B. Renewed Judicial Oversight of the Scope of the Commerce Power
For more than half a century-from 1937 to 1995-the Supreme
Court allowed Congress nearly unfettered discretion to determine the
limits of its regulatory power under the commerce clause.2 6 Since
United States v. Lopez,'27 however, the comfortable assumption that
Congress could treat the commerce power as a plenary police power
has been exploded.
The Court has reduced the deference it will pay to Congress's
judgment that a given intrastate activity is sufficiently related to
interstate commerce that Congress may regulate that activity. In
Lopez the Court invalidated the federal Gun-Free School Zones
Act," which prohibited possession of a gun in or near schools. In
doing so, it made clear that a regulated activity must have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce to enable Congress to
invoke as a source of regulatory authority the branch of the
commerce power that enables it to regulate activities solely because
the coercion element of Dole, or sharpen the required connection between the spending
and the federal interest in the program, or adopt Justice O'Connor's suggestion that the
condition be directly tied to the manner in which the funds are spent, or develop a formula
for meaningful judicial oversight of what constitutes the general welfare, or some
combination of these notions.
126. For much of this period the Court deferred to the congressional judgment about
the scope of the commerce power so long as it was rational to conclude that an activity
Congress chose to regulate was either in commerce or substantially affected such
commerce. The beginning of this era of deference was NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). The apparent beginning of the end was United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995). This statement must be qualified by noting that National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), and its progeny represented an abortive attempt to assert
judicial review over one narrow aspect of the commerce power-its use to regulate core
attributes of state sovereignty.
127. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
128. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994).
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of their effect on interstate commerce.129 The Court also suggested
that the lack of congressional findings of fact on the effect on
interstate commerce of gun possession in or near schools was a factor
that contributed to the Court's de novo review of the substantiality of
the effect. In United States v. Morrison,13' in which the Court struck
down the civil remedy provision of the federal Violence Against
Women Act,"' the Court, however, showed no deference to an
explicit congressional finding that violence motivated by the sex of
the victim had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Instead,
the Court effectively declared that when the regulated activity is an
intrastate non-economic activity it will decide for itself whether the
aggregate effects of the regulated activity on interstate commerce are
sufficiently substantial to support congressional regulation. In doing
so, it revived aspects of the "dual sovereignty" approach of Hammer
v. Dagenhart,"' albeit limited to the "substantial effects" aspect of
commerce doctrine: Congress, said the Court, may not "use the
Commerce Clause to completely obliterate the distinction between
national and local authority.... [The] Constitution requires a
distinction between what is truly national and truly local."'
33
Be that as it may, there is doubt about the practicality of the
means by which this distinction can be served in the context of the
commerce power. There are several possibilities, each of which is
considered in turn.
(1) Procedural Deference
The Court could insist on a clear statement of congressional
findings of fact that the activities it seeks to regulate are either in
commerce or have a substantial effect on commerce. If the Court
were to defer to such findings (if rational), judicial review would
amount to another procedural requirement, a reminder to Congress
that it does not have unlimited power and that it must link factually
its use of regulatory authority to an identified constitutional source of
regulatory authority. But the Court appears content to confine its
procedural federalism to matters of more direct federal interference
with state governance mechanisms. In Morrison the Court exhibited
129. This branch of the commerce power began its modern development in Houston,
East & West Texas Ry. Co. v. United States (The Shreveport Rate Case), 234 U.S. 342
(1914), in which the Court upheld federal authority to regulate intrastate railroad freight
rates where the effect of those rates was felt on interstate commerce. Sometimes known
as the "protective principle," this aspect of the commerce power was the sole basis
available to justify the validity of the Gun-Free School Zones Act.
130. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1995).
132. 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
133. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615, 617-18.
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no deference to congressional fact-finding that supported at least a
rational judgment that sex-based violence, particularly that directed
at women by reason of their sex, had a substantial inhibitory effect on
interstate commerce. The Court's reluctance to apply a purely
procedural limit seems consistent with its expressed desire to separate
substantively the national from the local. A procedural limit is
unlikely to do so. The famous Dutch dikes form a substantive barrier
to flooding of the polders of Holland. If instead of the dikes the
Dutch were to rely on an elaborate procedure of mobilization of
Netherlanders to stack sandbags whenever there is a clear threat of
flooding, this procedural barrier would be ridiculously inadequate.
At some point, it is apparent, the Court wants a federalism of dikes,
not one of alarm bells.
(2) Procedural Non-Deference
The Court could apply, as it did in Jones v. United States,'34 the
canon of statutory interpretation that "where a statute is susceptible
of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful
constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such
questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter."135 In Jones the
Court overturned a conviction under the federal arson statute 16 as
applied to the arson of an owner-occupied private residence. The
statute made criminal arson of "any building ... used in interstate or
foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign
commerce."37 Because the Court was of the view that a reading of the
arson statute that included within its coverage any arson that
"affected interstate commerce," no matter how slight, would raise a
significant question of the validity of the statute,'3 the Court
interpreted the statutory language to include only arson of buildings
actually used in a commercial manner.1 39  A related version of
"procedural non-deference" is the requirement, associated with
United States v. Bass,4 that "unless Congress conveys its purpose
clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the
134. 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
135. Id. at 857 (quoting United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson
Co., 213 U.S. 366,408 (1909)). This principle was also cited in Edward J. De Bartolo Corp.
v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
Perhaps the most famous statement of this principle is in Justice Brandeis' summation of
the various canons the Court is supposed to use to avoid a decision on constitutional
grounds. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
136. 18 U.S.C. § 844 (i) (2001).
137. Id. (emphasis added).
138. Jones, 529 U.S. at 858.
139. Id. at 850.
140. 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971).
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federal-state balance in the prosecution of crimes..... Through each
of these procedural devices-narrow statutory interpretation to avoid
decisions on the outer boundaries of the commerce power and a clear
statement rule with respect to the federalization of crime-the Court
can and apparently will supplement its newly invigorated substantive
review of the commerce power. To continue the dike metaphor,
while the Court insists on a federalism of dikes it is not averse to a
procedure that might relieve some pressure on those dikes.
(3) Commerce and Non-Commerce
The Court could distinguish between commercial and non-
commercial activities, deferring to rational congressional judgments
about the effect on interstate commerce of commercial activities and
displaying no deference to such judgments about non-commercial
activities. The Court has not yet explicitly done so, preferring instead
to hint that it will not defer to such congressional determinations
when Congress regulates an intrastate and non-commercial activity."'
But this still requires a rule to distinguish the commercial from the
non-commercial. Until the 1930s revolution, the Court was fairly
consistent in defining "commerce" in its eighteenth century meaning
of trade or exchange as opposed to manufacture or agriculture,
activities that brought articles of commercial exchange into
existence.143 The classic examples remain Chief Justice Fuller's
declamation in United States v. E.C. Knight Co. 44 that "[c]ommerce
succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part of it,, 145 and Justice George
Sutherland's statement in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.:146 "Mining brings
the subject matter of commerce into existence. Commerce disposes
of it."'14 Professor Randy Barnett has ably demonstrated that the
public understanding of the term "commerce" at the time of
constitutional ratification was limited to trade, exchange, and
navigation, as distinguished from business activity dependent on
141. Jones, 529 U.S. at 858.
142. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613: "While we need not adopt a categorical rule against
aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity..., thus far in our Nation's history
our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that
activity is economic in nature."
143. See, e.g., SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICrIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (J.F.
Rivington et al. eds., 6th ed. 1785) (Commerce: "1. Intercourse; exchange of one thing for
another; interchange of any thing; trade; traffick"; Agriculture: "The art of cultivating the
ground; tillage; husbandry, as distinct from pasturage"; Manufacture: "1. The practice of
making any piece of workmanship. 2. Any thing made by art.").
144. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
145. Id at 12.
146. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
147. Id. at 304.
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commerce, primarily agriculture and manufacturing." None of this,
however, explains why we should interpret the Constitution today in
accord with the original meaning of the terms employed in the
Constitution. To address that separate issue would require an
additional article. For present purposes, it is enough to note that
serious commitment to a distinction between commercial and non-
commercial activity may necessitate a judicial return to commerce-as-
exchange (as opposed to production of the articles of such exchange),
an approach that poses problems. Into which category does the
service economy fit? Is the physician's examination and diagnosis
commerce-a service supplied in exchange for money-or is it prior to
or following the commerce of the physician's negotiation of the rate
of reimbursement she will receive from the patient's health
maintenance organization? But Lopez and Morrison do not suggest
that the distinction between commercial and -non-commercial
activities, however chimerical, is always the critical inquiry. Neither
Lopez nor Morrison suggest that the Court will reject deference to
Congress when it seeks to regulate an interstate non-commercial
activity. Indeed, the Court's continued acceptance of congressional
power to regulate the instrumentalities of interstate commerce
suggests that there would be no post-Lopez, post-Morrison commerce
clause obstacle to regulation of avowedly non-commercial telephone
use. There is simply no indication that the Court is poised to
undermine Champion v. Ames49 or any other chestnuts of this genre.
(4) "Among the Several States"
The Court could read the scope of Congress's power "to regulate
commerce among the several States" as limited to activities that are
within the category of commerce among the several states.
According to Professor Barnett the original meaning of the phrase
was that "Congress can only regulate gainful activity that takes place
between people of different states.""50 This is not to say that Congress
lacks (or should lack) any power to regulate activities that do not
involve commercial intercourse between citizens of different states,
148. See Randy Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 101, 111-125 (2001).
149. 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (upholding the federal Lottery Act, which prohibited
interstate shipment of lottery tickets, as applied to such a shipment). While the Court
concluded that the lottery tickets were an "article of commerce" it is hardly deniable that
Congress was motivated by a desire to stamp out what it regarded as the moral evil of
gambling. The conclusion that lottery tickets were articles of commerce was perhaps
necessary to the decision in 1903 but would seemingly be unnecessary today, even after
Lopez and Morrison.
150. Barnett, supra note 148, at 136. See id. at 132-39 for Barnett's discussion of the
evidence leading to this conclusion.
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but it is to suggest that the Court might well deny the usual
presumption of validity to congressional regulation of activities that
are wholly intrastate. To do so, of course, the Court would be forced
to repudiate the entire "protective principle," a staple of commerce
clause doctrine since at least the Shreveport Rate Case.5' Nothing in
Lopez or Morrison suggests that the Court is willing to circumscribe
the commerce power in so radical a fashion.
(5) Regulation or Prohibition
Ever since Champion v. Ames 2 it has been settled that the
power to regulate interstate commerce includes the power to prohibit
such commerce. It is not self-evident that the Court is correct in this
conclusion. Examination of the context in which the Constitution
uses the terms "regulate" and "prohibit" and their variants suggests
that, apart from the commerce clause, the terms are distinctly
different and the verb "to regulate" was not used by the
Constitution's authors to include the power "to prohibit"'' 3 except
with respect to foreign commerce." The Court could embark on the
venture of limiting the commerce power to regulation short of
prohibition, or it could limit the prohibitory power to those activities
that are "inherently injurious," though how such activities would be
identified is a mystery in itself." However, there is absolutely no
indication in Lopez or Morrison that the Court is willing, much less
ready, to make any doctrine out of this contextual evidence.
(6) Elimination of the Aggregation Principle
Justice Thomas, concurring in Lopez, questioned the validity of
the aggregation principle, the idea that the relevant impact on
interstate commerce of a regulated activity is the impact on
commerce of the regulated activity considered as a whole, not the
effect on such commerce produced by any specific action within the
151. 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
152. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
153. Barnett, supra note 148, at 139-46.
154. Id. at 143-46.
155. The Court embraced such a doctrine in the era of Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S.
251 (1918), where the majority sought to confine the use of the commerce power in such
cases as Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (prohibition of interstate shipment of
lottery tickets), Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911) (seizure of impure
eggs that had moved in interstate commerce), Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913)
(prohibition of interstate transport of women for immoral purposes, as applied to
commercial prostitution), and Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) (same, as
applied to non-commercial adultery) to instances where "the character of the particular
subjects" was such that "the use of interstate transportation was necessary to the
accomplishment of harmful results." Hammer, 247 U.S. at 270-71.
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regulated class of activities.'56 The problem with aggregation, as
Justice Thomas saw it, was that the principle "has no stopping point.
[One] always can draw the circle broadly enough to cover an activity
that, when taken in isolation, would not have substantial effects on
commerce."' 7 Elimination of the aggregation principle would enable
individuals engaging in regulated activities to escape regulation by
demonstrating that the effect on interstate commerce of their actions,
considered in isolation, is insignificant. This result is precisely what
the Court in Maryland v. Wirtz56 disavowed, and for good reason. It
is the nature of general regulations that they cover all instances to
which they apply, and exceptions carved out piecemeal on the basis of
the individualized character of the regulated activity is an invitation
to litigation and public resentment of the seemingly random nature of
the regulation.
But Justice Thomas was correct to attack the aggregation
principle as unbounded and thus an invitation to Congress to regulate
even more than it might desire in order to establish the requisite
effect of the regulated activity upon interstate commerce. Some
limiting principle is necessary and the majority in Lopez did not
suggest one. The Court's refusal to defer to Congress on the question
of what constitutes a substantial effect on interstate commerce may
limit congressional power, but not in the same way that a limit on the
aggregation principle would accomplish. The Court's refusal to defer
to Congress merely substitutes the Court's judgment for that of
Congress on the question of whether the aggregate impact on
commerce of the regulated activity is sufficiently substantial to
validate the legislation. While this is a significant change, because it
represents a move from deferential minimal scrutiny to what might be
called non-deferential minimal scrutiny (a level of review that might
be considerably more stringent than the facial doctrine would suggest
because it is the Court's judgment that matters now), it continues to
allow Congress to define the activities whose aggregate effects count
for commerce clause analysis. However non-deferential this new
level of review turns out to be, it contains no substantive check on the
aggregation principle itself, a check that would limit the judgment of
anyone, judge or legislator, who might be assessing the impact of a
regulated activity on interstate commerce. For Justice Thomas's
criticism to flourish, something more is needed.
156. The principle originated in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), and has been
adhered to ever since. See also Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Maryland v.
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
157. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 600 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
158. 392 U.S. at 197 n.27 (1968) ("[W]here a general regulatory statute bears a
substantial relation to [interstate] commerce, the de minimis character of individual
instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.").
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One possibility is to breathe new life into the "proper" aspect of
the necessary and proper clause. As Gary Lawson and Patricia
Granger have argued, the means available to Congress to implement
its enumerated powers ought themselves be limited to avenues that
comport with the outer limits on the ends they purportedly serve.159
In essence, this is a call to the Court to invoke John Marshall's
"pretext qualifier"from McCulloch v. Maryland."6 Despite regular
declarations by the Court that it does not examine Congress's motive,
a principle enshrined in commerce clause jurisprudence by United
States v. Darby,16 the Court does in fact do so. Even when applying
minimal scrutiny to presumptively valid legislative classifications the
Court has divided over whether it should accept post hoc hypothetical
objectives or scrutinize the record to divine the actual purposes of
Congress.62 And, of course, determination of the actual purpose of
any given classification by sex is a staple of the intermediate scrutiny
applied to such classifications.63 There is room for the Court to
examine the actual purpose of Congress in enacting legislation that
regulates intrastate non-commercial activities, and to void those laws
that have as their actual purpose the accomplishment of an end that is
not substantially related to interstate commercial activity. Even
Darby does not stand in the way of this move, for there the Court
declared that Congress's "motive and purpose" was beyond judicial
scrutiny only when the law constitutes "a regulation of interstate
commerce,"164 and that, of course, is precisely the question the Court
would seek to answer by examining the actual purpose of a regulation
that on its face does not touch upon interstate commerce.
Another possibility is some version of the substantial
overbreadth principle used in free speech jurisprudence. A statute
regulating speech that on its face has a disproportionate number of
possible unconstitutional applications is regarded as substantially
overbroad and thus invalid in all its applications. 65 Transposed to the
commerce clause, the overbreadth principle might require that the
159. See Lawson & Granger, supra note 121.
160. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
161. 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941). "The motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate
commerce are matters for the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the
Constitution places no restriction and over which the courts are given no control....
Whatever their motive and purpose, regulations of commerce which do not infringe some
constitutional prohibition are within the plenary power conferred on Congress by the
Commerce Clause." Id.
162. See, e.g., United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
163. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
164. 312 U.S. at 115.
165. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); Bd. of Airport Comm'rs of
Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987); Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451
(1987).
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class of activities regulated bear some proportional relation to the
actual problem identified by Congress and supported by its findings
of fact. This vision of overbreadth has recent analogues in the other
areas of constitutional law.a66 Such a requirement would impose on
Congress the burden of demonstrating on the legislative record a
legitimate problem that its resulting legislation is tailored to fit. This
does not mean that Congress must meet the burden of strict
scrutiny-narrow tailoring or necessity-but it does mean that
Congress could not simply expand the size of the regulated class until
it had regulated enough to constitute a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. Under this test, for example, if Congress desired to limit
air pollution emissions from backyard barbecues, wood stoves, and
fireplaces in order to address the problem of global warming it would
be required to demonstrate that pollution from the regulated sources
form a substantial part of the pollution problem that Congress sought
to regulate. Congress might simply declare its purpose to be to
improve local air quality but then it might be required to demonstrate
that the regulated activities have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. That burden is not impossible to meet; asking Congress
to meet it would keep Congress focused on the limits of its delegated
powers rather than indulging in the fantasy that its powers are always
broad enough to accommodate the latest fashions in regulation.
There may be other ideas that could prove attractive to the
Court. I make no claim of having exhausted this field. Rather, it is
my objective merely to point out that this remains a fertile source of
doctrinal development for an emerging doctrine of judicially
enforceable federalism.
(7) Further Thoughts
Although the Court in Lopez and Morrison took a much more
skeptical and non-deferential look at exercises of the commerce
power that combine regulation of a non-commercial activity with
regulation of an intrastate activity, it eschewed any of the more
radical possibilities discussed above. The Court tinkered with existing
doctrine rather than challenging its foundations.
A deeper rethinking is in order. The problem with the
commerce clause is that we have not constructed doctrine to deal with
the fundamental issues presented by the modem affirmative use of
166. In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the Court imposed a requirement
of proportionality between the remedy and the problem when Congress invokes its power
to enforce the substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), the Court fashioned a requirement of "rough proportionality"
between the burden imposed on a property owner as a condition to development of his
property and the impact of that development on matters of legitimate concern to the
government.
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the power. Dormant commerce clause doctrine, whatever its defects,
at least addresses one central concern of the commerce power-the
creation and maintenance of a national market free of state-imposed
trade barriers. But the doctrine that controls Congress's active
exercise of its commerce-based regulatory power never deals with the
core question presented by our modem penchant to use the
commerce power as a catch-all source of federal regulatory authority:
Under what circumstances is national action justified?'67
The Constitution's structure suggests a presumption against the
exercise of national power; only the federal government is required to
justify its exercise of power by pointing to a textual grant of authority
for the power exercised. This state of affairs-the anomalous and
mildly disfavored nature of federal power-sufficiently permeated
our thinking about the allocation of governmental power that as late
as 1954 Herbert Wechsler could say (with tongue apparently not
planted in cheek) that "[n]ational action has.., always been regarded
as exceptional in our polity, an intrusion to be justified by some
necessity, the special rather than the ordinary case."'1 But now it is
vogue among academicians (and perhaps some federal politicians) to
claim that there are no longer any limits on federal legislative
power, 69 or at least any limits that courts can or should enforce."
Transposed to the commerce clause key, the tune sung by these
brides of federal power is that the commerce power is as vast as
Congress wants it to be. Such claims ignore or fail to appreciate the
role played by federalism in preserving liberty, collective autonomy,
and political accountability.
The reason that the commerce power has been inflated into a
grotesque parody of itself is that we have insisted, sometimes
correctly, upon national action to address problems created by states
inflicting negative external costs on the nation as a whole, and many
167. Donald Regan puts the question as follows: "Is there some reason the federal
government must be able to do this, some reason why we cannot leave the matter to the
states?" Donald Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and
Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 555 (1995). Regan
notes that the sixth resolution offered by Virginia in the 1787 convention urged that
Congress should have power "to legislate in all cases for the general interests of the union,
and also in those to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the harmony
of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual Legislation." Id. at
555-56 (quoting NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED
BY JAMES MADISON 380 (1966)).
168. Herbert Wcchsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 544
(1954).
169. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
170. See, e.g., JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS (1980); Kramer, supra note 14; Moulton, supra note 15.
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of the most egregious external costs are not commercial in nature.
The paradigmatic illustrative example is the problem of racial
apartheid that permeated the Jim Crow era. National action was
indispensable to correction of the mammoth external costs imposed
by the racist practitioners of apartheid, 7' but the commerce clause
was not the most adroit vehicle for the action.
Consider the contortionist rationale of Katzenbach v. McClung."r
Congress could forbid Ollie's Barbecue from racial discrimination
with respect to its customers because 46% of its food had moved in
interstate commerce. But what was the connection between the
movement of food in interstate commerce and the racial
discrimination practiced by Ollie's Barbecue? The Court argued that
Ollie's discriminatory conduct depressed demand for food moving in
interstate commerce." 3 As Donald Regan has put it, so what?17  If
the Court meant by this observation that the commerce clause
empowers Congress to do anything it thinks will promote the
interstate movement of goods there is no limit to this power. May
Congress require homeowners to wash their windows weekly in order
to promote the interstate movement of window cleaning supplies?
May Congress mandate consumption of a daily glass of wine in order
to promote the interstate movement of wine? Or prohibit wine
consumption in order to promote the interstate movement of hard
liquor and beer? If that is not fanciful enough, consider the Court's
contention that Congress could regulate all aspects of Ollie's
Barbecue because a substantial amount of the food it served had
moved in interstate commerce."5 By this reasoning could Congress
enact a national dress code applicable to all people who either
regularly use an instrumentality of interstate commerce or regularly
travel across state lines? Surely the regulation imposed must bear
some logical relationship to the interstate movement. The ability of
Congress to seize adulterated food that has moved in interstate
commerce is an example of such a relationship,'76 but the link between
admittedly odious racial discrimination and interstate food movement
is so ludicrously attenuated that it is hard to believe the Court was
171. I do not mean to imply that racial apartheid was objectionable solely on the
ground that it inflicted costs on the portions of the nation that did not practice apartheid.
It was objectionable primarily on moral grounds, and that fact is what should have led us
into using the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the commerce power, as the source of
congressional power to dismantle the apartheid structure practiced by American states.
See infra text accompanying notes 182-83.
172. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
173. IL at 299-300.
174. Regan, supra note 167, at 597.
175. McClung, 379 U.S. at 304.
176. See Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911).
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willing to put it on paper. Nor can it be said that congressional use of
the commerce power was valid because Ollie's discrimination was
part of a larger cultural pattern of racial discrimination in Alabama
that discouraged the interstate movement of people into Alabama.'7
States, of course, may not close off their borders to outsiders ,
impose penalties on those who exercise their constitutional right to
migrate,179 or treat newcomers differently from old-timers,so but there
is nothing that compels states to act to make themselves attractive
candidates for interstate migration. If Massachusetts wants to impose
ruinous but non-discriminatory taxation rates that have the effect of
discouraging immigration it is free to do so. Nor was the Court's
contention that Ollie's racial discrimination depressed access by
blacks to goods that had moved in interstate commerce 181 of any
relevance to the commerce power. Neither the commerce clause nor
any other part of the Constitution secures a general right of access to
interstate commerce. So long as states act in a manner that does not
discriminate against interstate commerce they are free to forbid the
use or possession of, say, tobacco products.
What was at issue in McClung was something very different-the
right of black Americans to be treated the same way as all other
Americans, with no special disadvantage visited upon them by reason
of their ancestral heritage. This is the province of the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments, not the commerce power. Congress chose
the commerce power to implement the promise of equal citizenship
because it was afraid of the Civil Rights Cases.'8 The Court contorted
the commerce power because it was morally just and politically and
socially imperative that the 1964 Civil Rights Act be upheld. But the
cost that we have paid in erosion of federalism was unnecessarily
incurred. With the benefit of hindsight, the 1964 Civil Rights Act
should have been grounded in section 2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment, which as interpreted by Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,'3
gives Congress the power "rationally to determine what are the
badges and the incidents of slavery"'84 and to act to eliminate those
badges and incidents of our lamentable past. Or Congress and the
Court could have concluded that the public accommodations
provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act were a valid exercise of
Congress's power to enforce the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth
177. McClung, 379 U.S. at 301.
178. See, e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
179. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
180. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
181. McClung, 379 U.S. at 299-300.
182. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
183. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
184. Id. at 440.
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Amendment, thus adopting the view expressed by the elder Justice
Harlan in the Civil Rights Cases." Or Congress and the Court could
have concluded that the public accommodations title of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act was a valid exercise of Congress's power to remedy state
denials of equal protection that inhered in the states' refusal to
deliver to blacks the same access to public accommodations that the
common law of those states delivered to whites.
The tale of Ollie's Barbecue demonstrates the importance of
clear thinking about the relationship between commerce clause
doctrine and other sources of national power. We should rejoice that
the Court in McClung upheld the public accommodations provisions
of the Civil Rights Act, but we should lament the constitutional
perversion that was employed to that end. When thinking about
federalism we must not lose sight of the occasions for exercise of
federal power and the appropriate sources of authority for that
exercise. When we engage in expedient reasoning to accomplish an
appropriate national objective we produce an immediate benefit at
the cost of a long-term distortion of our federal structure, a distortion
that imperils the value of federalism. The hand-wringing about
Lopez and Morrison is utterly misplaced; the possession of guns in
schools was already illegal under Texas law and the addition of a
federal civil remedy to victims of sex-based violence added relatively
little to the tort remedies already available in the state courts. In
neither case was the occasion for exercise of federal power of much
moment, but the marginal degradation of constitutional structure and
the values preserved by federalism that would have occurred had
these statutes been upheld under the commerce clause was indeed
significant."
C. Abrogation of Eleventh Amendment Immunity
In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Floridalel the Court overruled its
prior decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.ln that Congress
could exercise its Article I, section 8 powers to abrogate the states'
sovereign immunity recognized in the Eleventh Amendment."9
185. 109 U.S. at 46-47, 53-55 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
186. Of course, Morrison also presented the question of whether the federal civil
remedy for victims of sex-motivated violence was a valid exercise of Congress's
enforcement authority under the Fourteenth Amendment. That separate issue is
considered in Part II, D, infra.
187. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
188. 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
189. A four-justice plurality of the Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, held that
Congress could abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity under any of its
sources of authority. Id. In an opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice White agreed
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Seminole Tribe held that congressional power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity was limited to its Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement power."' Not only did Seminole Tribe make it
significantly more difficult for Congress to abrogate the states'
sovereign immunity, the decision raised the stakes with respect to the
scope of Congress's power under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to enforce the substantive guarantees of that
amendment, because the enforcement power was left as the only
avenue for Congress to subject the states to liability to private
litigants for damages attributable to their violation of federal law.
The entire notion of state sovereign immunity from suit for
damages in federal court is problematic. The federalism value of
political accountability is fostered by ensuring that states remain fully
liable for the damages they cause to private actors. But the
imposition of such liability exacts a price in terms of a diminution of
collective autonomy, because the damages paid are not paid from
some abstract source but come from the collective coffers of the state,
thus reducing the state's ability to undertake other expensive policy
initiatives that might be desired by the state polity. Ever since Hans
v. Louisiana'9' the Court has been persuaded that the Eleventh
Amendment embodies a pre-constitutional attribute of state
sovereignty, one not surrendered in the original plan of the
Constitution. Though that conclusion may be driven more by its
reading of history than an assessment of the competing federalism
values at stake, the Court did acknowledge the value of collective
autonomy in its decision in Alden v. Maine:'
A general federal power to authorize private suits for money
damages would place unwarranted strain on the States' ability to
govern in accordance with the will of their citizens.... [The]
allocation of scarce resources among competing needs and interests
lies at the heart of the political process. While the judgment
creditor of a State may have a legitimate claim for compensation,
other important needs and worthwhile ends compete for access to
the public fisc. Since all cannot be satisfied in full, it is inevitable
that difficult decisions involving the most sensitive and political ofjudgments must be made. If the principle of representative
government is to be preserved to the States, the balance between
competing interests must be reached after deliberation by the
with Justice Brennan's conclusion although he could "not agree with much of his
reasoning." Id. at 57 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
190. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). The conclusion was reinforced in
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527
U.S.627, 636 (1999) (Congress may not use its Article I power to regulate copyrights and
trademarks to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity).
191. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
192. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
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political process established by the citizens of the State, not by
judicial decree mandated by the Federal Government and invoked
by the private citizen.l 3
Whether or not this is an appropriate balance in terms of the
competing federalism values at stake, the Eleventh Amendment cases
do leave private litigants with the ability to use federal courts to
enjoin unconstitutional behavior by state officials, and the federal
government can still sue states directly in federal court to enforce
federal law. Thus, even though current Eleventh Amendment
doctrine impedes citizen accountability, it does not destroy it, and it
advances the value of collective autonomy."
Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment cases make clear (if it was
not beforehand) that the Court regards the principle of sovereign
immunity as rooted in a pre-constitutional attribute of the states'
existence. The Eleventh Amendment, in this view, did not create
state sovereign immunity but simply recognized and confirmed a state
of affairs that had existed before the Constitution and which was
intended to be maintained after constitutional ratification. It is
interesting to compare this Eleventh Amendment doctrine with U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,1ss in which the Court held that states
lacked authority to establish term limits on their members of
Congress. The Constitution is silent on the precise issue and the
Court divided, 5-4, on the structural "default rules" that should apply
when confronted by such textual lacuna. The majority concluded that
the power to set qualifications for members of Congress was a power
that states lacked prior to the Constitution because Congress, and
state representation in Congress, is a creature of the Constitution. As
Justice Stevens observed in his majority opinion, "the power to add
qualifications is not part of the original powers of sovereignty that the
Tenth Amendment reserved to the States.... '[T]he states can
exercise no powers whatsoever, which exclusively spring out of the
existence of the national government, which the constitution does not
delegate to them. [No] state can say[] that it has reserved[] what it
never possessed... The dissenters, led by Justice Thomas, argued
that because the
193. Id. at 750-51.
194. A general discussion of the merits (or demerits) of state sovereign immunity and
the appropriate interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment is outside the scope of this
paper. Academic discussion on these points is vast. My contribution to the literature is
Calvin Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 61 (1989).
195. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
196. Id. at 802 (quoting 2 JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIE,- ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 627 (1833)).
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Constitution derives its authority... from the consent of the people
of the States... it would simply be incoherent to assert that the
people of the States could not reserve any powers they had not
previously controlled.
... [If] someone says that the power to use a particular facility is
reserved to some group, he is not saying anything about whether
that group has previously used the facility. He is merely saying that
the people who control the facility have designated that group as
the entity with authority to use it. The Tenth Amendment is
similar: The people of the States, from whom all governmental
powers stem, have specified that all powers not prohibited to the
States by the Federal Constitution are reserved "to the States
respectively, or to the people."'97
The tortured evolution of state sovereign immunity is similar.
Chisholm v. Georgia19 read the text of Article III to grant the federal
courts power to hear suits for damages brought against states
although there was no explicit waiver by the states of any sovereign
immunity they may previously have enjoyed under the law of nations.
The Eleventh Amendment, according to Hans v. Louisiana'" and the
conventional understanding, was simply a recognition that the Court
in Chisholm was wrong to ignore the reservation of state sovereign
immunity implicit in the Constitution. On one hand, current
Eleventh Amendment doctrine is consistent with U.S. Term Limits
because the states possessed some sovereign immunity under the law
of nations, although even that might be debatable given the nature of
the American Revolution. For example, in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp.,m Justice George Sutherland, writing for the
Court, argued that by the Declaration of Independence (and
subsequent victory in arms) "the powers of external sovereignty
passed from the Crown not to the colonies severally, but to the
colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as the United
States of America." '' On the other hand, current Eleventh
Amendment doctrine is inconsistent with U.S. Term Limits because
the scope of state sovereign immunity far exceeds the express
contours of that immunity in the Eleventh Amendment. Whichever
reading is better, the point remains that the Court is willing to read a
197. Id. at 851-52 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
198. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
199. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
200. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
201. Id. at 316. Justice Sutherland's historical reading has been criticized. See, e.g.,
Raoul Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1
(1972); Julius Goebel, Jr., Constitutional History and Constitutional Law, 38 COLuM. L.
REV. 555 (1938); David Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice
Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L. J. 467 (1946);Charles A. Lofgren, United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L. J. 1 (1973).
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background principle into the Constitution to preserve some measure
of state autonomy through sovereign immunity but is quite unwilling
to do the same with respect to state autonomy to add qualifications
for membership in Congress. Perhaps the most charitable
explanation is that sovereign immunity does protect the value of
collective autonomy, however imperfectly and at some cost in terms
of citizen accountability, but permitting states to add to congressional
qualifications produces little in terms of collective autonomy (apart
from the qualifications themselves) while imposing potentially
significant external costs on the remainder of the nation.
D. Limiting the Scope of the Section 5 Enforcement Power
The Court has confined congressional power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment 2 to "remedial" action, thus overruling the
alternative holding of Katzenbach v. Morgan 03 which had suggested
that Congress could alter the substance of Fourteenth Amendment
rights so long as it did not "restrict, abrogate, or dilute" them.20 In
City of Boerne v. Flores,25 the Court struck down as applied to the
states the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 206 an act that was
frankly designed to reverse the Court's decision in Employment
Division v. Smith,20 7 which held that generally applicable criminal laws
that impinge upon religious conduct do not offend the free exercise
guarantee. The test, said the Court, to divine the difference between
remedial and substantive enforcement of Fourteenth Amendment
rights, was whether the congressional action was "congruent" with the
constitutional violation sought to be remedied and whether that
congressional action was a "proportional" response to the violation.
Thus, in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v.
College Savings Bank,2 the Court concluded that there was
insufficient evidence that states were violating the Constitution's
takings clause by their unauthorized use of other people's intellectual
property to support the claim that congressional abrogation of
Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to such matters was a
proportional response to the violation. In the absence of such
proportionality, Congress's invocation of its power to enforce the
constitutional rights incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment
was not remedial and was thus invalid. In Kimel v. Florida Board of
202. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, §5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
203. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
204. Id. at 651 n.10.
205. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
206. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. (2001).
207. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
208. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
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Regents,2 the Court concluded that the federal Age Discrimination in
Employment Act,2 10 which prohibits all age discrimination in public
employment was neither congruent with the constitutional violation
nor proportional to it because, constitutionally speaking, government
age discrimination is valid unless it is not rationally related to a
legitimate objective. The statutory provision at issue applied to so
much more activity than was constitutionally prohibited that it was
neither congruent nor proportional.
In United States v. Morrison,2  in the course of striking down the
civil remedy provisions of the Violence Against Women Act,92 2 the
Court concluded that the provision of a federal tort remedy to victims
of sex-motivated violence was beyond the Court's enforcement power
for one old reason and a newly manufactured one. The old reason,
rooted in the Civil Rights Cases,21 3 was that the remedy was not
directed at any state actor or action: The civil remedy provision "is
not aimed at proscribing discrimination by officials which the
Fourteenth Amendment might not itself proscribe; it is directed not
at any State or state actor, but at individuals who have committed
criminal acts motivated by gender bias. 2 4 The Court thus reaffirmed
its commitment to the principle created by the Civil Rights Cases that,
because the substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment
are applicable only to state action, the power of Congress to enforce
those substantive provisions is similarly limited, a conclusion that
flows logically enough from the premise that Congress's enforcement
power is exclusively remedial.
The new reason was a remarkable extension of the old reason.
Because there was no proof in the legislative record that state
discrimination against victims of sex-based violence in providing
remedies for that violence was geographically widespread (even
though Congress had identified twenty-one states in which it believed
such discrimination occurred) the Court concluded that the creation
of a civil remedy for such violence was neither congruent with nor
proportional to the constitutional violation. The Court said that the
civil remedy provision
is also different from [the] previously upheld remedies [in
Katzenbach v. Morgan and South Carolina v. Katzenbach2 5] in that
it applies uniformly throughout the Nation. Congress' findings
indicate that the problem of discrimination against the victims of
209. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
210. 29 U.S.C. § 621 etseq. (1994).
211. 529 U.s. 598 (2000).
212. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1995).
213. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
214. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626.
215. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
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gender-motivated crimes does not exist in all States, or even most
States. By contrast, the § 5 remedy upheld in Katzenbach v.
Morgan was directed only to the State where the evil found by
Congress existed, and in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, [in which
Congress imposed voting rights requirements on States that,
Congress found, had a history of discriminating against blacks in
voting,] the remedy was directed only to those States in which
Congress found that there had been discrimination.
21 6
In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,7
the Court elaborated upon the analytical process necessary to
determine whether congressional exercise of its enforcement power is
sufficiently congruent and proportional to be remedial. In the
Americans with Disabilities Act, Congress had invoked its power to
enforce the substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to
abrogate the states' sovereign immunity and subject them to liability
to private citizens for money damages for violation of the ADA.
2Y1
The Court found that this abrogation of state sovereign immunity was
ultra vires. First, the Court reiterated that Congress's "power 'to
enforce' the Amendment includes the authority both to remedy and
to deter violation of rights guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a
somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself
forbidden by the Amendment's text, 219 but also confirmed "that it is
the responsibility of this Court, not Congress, to define the substance
of constitutional guarantees.... Accordingly, § 5 legislation reaching
beyond the scope of § l's actual guarantees must exhibit 'congruence
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied
and the means adopted to that end."' ' 0 Second, the Court said that to
apply these principles one must first "identify with some precision the
scope of the constitutional right at issue, [an] inquiry [that] requires
us to examine the limitations § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
places upon States' treatment of the disabled."'" Those limits are
determined by the relevant substantive precedents. Because
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.' held that minimal scrutiny
applied to classifications on the basis of mental retardation and, by
implication, other related disabilities, the Court concluded "that
States are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make
216. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626-27.
217. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
218. See Title I of the Americans vith Disabilities Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 330, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12111-12117 (1994).
219. Garrett, 531 U.S. 365 (quoting Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81
(2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,536 (1997)).
220. Id. (quoting Flores, 521 U.S. at 520).
221. Id
222. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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special accommodations for the disabled, so long as their actions
towards such individuals are rational."'  Having defined
the metes and bounds of the constitutional right in question, we
examine whether Congress identified a history and pattern of
unconstitutional employment discrimination by the States against
the disabled.... The legislative record of the ADA, however,
simply fails to show that Congress did in fact identify a pattern of
irrational state discrimination in employment against the
disabled. 4
Congress made only general findings about historical societal
discrimination against the disabled, but failed to identify specific
instances of irrational discrimination by states against the disabled.
Instead, Congress assembled a long list of "unexamined, anecdotal
accounts of 'adverse, disparate treatment by state officials[,' action
that] often does not amount to a constitutional violation where
rational-basis scrutiny applies[, and which fails to establish] a pattern
of unconstitutional behavior by the States."'
But "[e]ven were it possible to squeeze out of these examples a
pattern of unconstitutional discrimination by the States, the rights and
remedies created by the ADA against the States' ' 6 were found to be
neither congruent with the violation or proportional to its extent.
The ADA's requirement that the disabled be reasonably
accommodated except when such accommodation would pose an
"undue hardship"'  was neither congruent nor proportional because
"the accommodation duty far exceeds what is constitutionally
required in that it makes unlawful a range of alternate responses that
would be reasonable but would fall short of imposing an 'undue
burden' upon the employer."29 The ADA's prohibition of any action
that has a disparate impact upon the disabled, ° "without regard to
whether such conduct has a rational basis,"'  was also neither
congruent nor proportional because "disparate impact.., evidence
223. Garrett, 531 U.S. 367.
224. Id. at 368.
225. Id. at 370.
226. Id. at 372.
227. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(5)(B), 12111(9) (1994), which require employers to
"make existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals
with disabilities."
228. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994), which exempts employers from the
"reasonable accommodation" requirement where the employer "can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such
covered entity."
229. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372.
230. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3)(A) (1994) (forbidding "utilizing standards, criteria, or
methods of administration" that have a disparate impact on the disabled).
231. 531 U.S. at 372.
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alone is insufficient even where the Fourteenth Amendment subjects
state action to strict scrutiny. '
The Court in Garrett drew a sharp contrast between the ADA
and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, upheld in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach.'3 When Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act it did
what it did not do in the case of the ADA: it "documented a marked
pattern of unconstitutional action by the States," ' including racially
biased application of voting tests in order to exclude black Americans
from registering to vote that contributed to a persistent and
"otherwise inexplicable 50-percentage-point gap in the registration of
white and African-American voters in some States." ' The Voting
Rights Act, in contrast to the ADA, was "a detailed but limited
remedial scheme designed to guarantee meaningful enforcement of
the Fifteenth Amendment in those areas of the Nation where
abundant evidence of States' systematic denial of those rights was
identified. ' ' 6 In short
there must be a pattern of discrimination by the States which
violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and the remedy imposed by
Congress must be congruent and proportional to the targeted
violation.... [To] uphold the [ADA's] application to the States
would allow Congress to rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment law
laid down by this Court in Cleburne. Section 5 does not so broadly
enlarge congressional authority2m
This string of cases limits Congress to enforcing what the Court
decides is the content of the Fourteenth Amendment, albeit with
latitude to deter violations before they occur. Congress is no longer
free to use section 5 to "remedy" constitutional violations by
outlawing behavior that is constitutionally valid. When Congress
seeks to address discrimination that is presumptively valid (e.g., age
discrimination) it must establish sound reasons why it thinks the
practice it seeks to address is constitutionally dubious. This means
that Congress must tailor its remedies carefully to the invidious
discrimination it identifies. Blunderbuss approaches, such as the
ADEA, VAWA, or the ADA, are not permissible, but a more
precisely tailored statute would be permissible.
The Court's approach to the section 5 power has been criticized
from a variety of perspectives. Some contend that limiting Congress
232. Id. (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,239 (1976)).
233. 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (holding that the Voting Rights Act was a valid exercise of
Congress's power under §2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, virtually identical to §5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment's protection against racial
discrimination in voting).
234. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 373.
235. Id.
236. Id
237. Id. at 374 (footnote omitted).
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to a remedial power wrongly shrinks the scope of the section 5
enforcement power; section 5, they say, contemplates an active role
for Congress in establishing the substance of the constitutional rights
secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.' Others argue that,
whatever the merits of that limitation upon scope, the Court erred by
limiting Congress's choice of means to enforce judicially determined
constitutional rights to those measures that are congruent with and
proportional to the identified constitutional violation sought to be
remedied. Some of these latter critics assert that there is no warrant
for subjecting federal legislation adopted pursuant to the section 5
enforcement power to virtually strict scrutiny; 9 others argue that
while the "congruence and proportionality" means test is more akin
to intermediate than strict scrutiny, it is still unjustified."4 None of
these criticisms are ultimately persuasive.
The view that Congress is entitled to define the substance of the
rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment is grounded in
various arguments. It is said that Congress, as an institution, is better
suited to identify state practices that, while literally valid in terms of
judicial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, raise the
possibility of hidden wrongful motives. This was the essence of
Justice Brennan's "ratchet" theory of congressional power under
section 5. But, as we shall see in a moment, this argument is merely a
restatement of what will turn out to be the fundamental question
here: Who should decide the content of constitutional norms-Court
or Congress? A more sophisticated argument for vesting Congress
with a power to define the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment
238. See, e.g., Akhil Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 818-826 (1999)
[hereinafter Amar, Intratextualism]; Michael Doff & Barry Friedman, Shared
Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 SuP. Cr. REV. 61; Steven Engel, The McCulloch Theory
of the Fourteenth Amendment: City of Boerne v. Flores and the Original Understanding of
Section 5, 109 YALE L. J. 115 (1999); Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of
Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 (1998); Michael McConnell, Institutions
and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores," 111 HARV. L. REV. 153 (1997)
[hereinafter McConnell, Institutions].
239. See, e.g., Justice Breyer's dissent in Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 383-85; 1 LAURENCE
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-16, at 959 (3d ed. 2000) (§5 measures are
subject to "something between intermediate and strict scrutiny," a standard that embodies
"a substantial, albeit not conclusive, presumption of unconstitutionality"); Robert Post &
Reva Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After
Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE LJ. 441,477 (2000).
240. See, e.g., Evan Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5
Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1158 (2001) [hereinafter Caminker, Means-Ends
Constraints] (the Flores congruence and proportionality test involves "searching
scrutiny"); Stephen Gardbaum, The Federalism Implications of Flores, 39 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 665, 682 (1998) (the Flores test is "more rigorous" than minimal scrutiny);
McConnell, Institutions, supra note 237, at 166 (the Flores test embodies a "narrow
tailoring requirement typical of intermediate scrutiny").
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is Akhil Amar's interpretive device of "intratextualism." Professor
Amar argues that similar (or identical) pieces of constitutional text
should be given a consistent meaning. Building on that insight he
observes that the Flores remedial reading of section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment is inconsistent with the Court's reading of
the scope of congressional power under section 2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment, although the two enforcement provisions are virtually
identical2 41 In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.2"2 the Court held that
under section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment Congress had power to
identify and outlaw those practices that it might reasonably think
constitute the badges or incidents of slavery, and that that
congressional power was broad enough to enable Congress to
prohibit the refusal by one private person to engage in commercial
dealings with another private person because of the latter person's
race. As Professor Amar notes, "No court ever said, or ever would
say, that when private person A refuses to deal commercially with
private person B because B is black, this refusal is 'slavery' or
'involuntary servitude' within the meaning of section 1 of the
Thirteenth Amendment."2 3 To Professor Amar there is no plausible
justification for reading Congress's enforcement power under section
2 of the Thirteenth Amendment to extend beyond the judicially
defined substance of section 1 of that amendment while reading
Congress's enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment as limited to remedial effectuation of the judicially
defined substance of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Amar's argument overlooks a crucial difference between the two
amendments. The Thirteenth Amendment is one of the very few
provisions of the Constitution that prohibits private behavior as well
as state action. Certainly the Thirteenth Amendment bars states
from establishing or enforcing laws instituting slavery, but it also bars
private persons from practicing slavery regardless of the state laws (or
lack of such laws) pertinent to that odious practice. The Fourteenth
Amendment, of course, is directed to governments, by establishing
citizenship and prohibiting certain practices of state governments.
Congress's enforcement power under section 2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment is more akin to its Article I powers, which enable
Congress to act directly upon private persons, than to its enforcement
power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which,
however interpreted, enables Congress only to prohibit certain
241. Compare U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII, § 2 ("Congress shall have power to enforce
this article by appropriate legislation") with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §5 ("The Congress
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article").
242. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
243. Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 238, at 823.
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actions of the states. The difference is relevant to the proper latitude
to be given Congress in defining that which the Constitution
prohibits. The Thirteenth Amendment was all about eliminating the
ghastly institution of slavery and all its trappings of racial
subordination. It was essential to that end to prohibit private conduct
steeped in slavery as well as the official state recognition of the
practice, and the Thirteenth Amendment did so. To reach the private
conduct that produced a verisimilitude of slavery by elaborate rituals
of private racial oppression it was essential that Congress identify and
outlaw those latter-day badges and incidents of the repudiated system
of slavery. As with any other grant of power to regulate private
behavior (e.g., the commerce power) Congress was given great
latitude to set policy, to determine reasonable and appropriate
measures executing its grant of power. But the Fourteenth
Amendment is an entirely different proposition. By that amendment
the states are barred from certain practices-most importantly, denial
of due process and equal protection-and there is no power given
Congress to set a different policy. Congress has no power to regulate
private behavior within a specified domain, as it has with respect to
slavery elimination or commerce regulation. Congress may only act
to ensure that the states do not violate due process or equal
protection. While it is true that the precise meaning of "equal
protection" or "due process" is not self-evident from text, it is also
true that there is nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment that
indicates a special preference for Congress as the definer of these
terms.
Nor is there much persuasive force in the argument that because
the Reconstruction Congresses that framed the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were suspicious of the courts,
regarding them (with some justification) as hostile to the
Reconstruction project, we should read the enforcement provisions of
those amendments as vesting in Congress a power to define the
substance of the rights guaranteed by those amendments. Such a
power is said to be necessary to effectuate the intentions of the
framers of the Reconstruction amendments. First, it is odd that the
same people who make this claim are often in the vanguard of those
who belittle such people as Edwin Meese when he urges ajurisprudence of original intention. For myself, I am deeply skeptical
that original intention can be located2 and, moreover, I do not think
that, even if located, it is necessarily binding upon us. The
Constitution that binds us is a written text, and the original meaning
of that text-the sense of the words used as generally understood at
the time of their adoption-is of central significance to any principled
244. See Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659 (1987).
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explication of it,24 whatever the intentions of the authors and ratifiers
of that text. Second, the methodology of original intentions is deeply
flawed. For example, the very same Congress that drafted and
proposed the Fourteenth Amendment countenanced official racial
segregation in the public schools of the District of Columbia.
Presumably those framers saw no dissonance between the guarantee
of equal protection and officially mandated racial separation.
Perhaps they partook of the sinister wine of separate but equal;
perhaps not, but they surely thought that equal protection and racial
apartheid could coexist. Are we thus to assume that the original
intention of the Fourteenth Amendment was to permit Congress to
mandate racial segregation in the name of enforcement of equal
protection? The logical (though obnoxious) end of this line of
reasoning is to conclude that Congress must have had power to
enforce equal protection after Brown v. Board of Education2 46 by
legislation that mandated a return to Plessy v. Ferguson.24 What
nonsense! But is it any more nonsensical to argue that Congress had
power to enforce free exercise of religion after Employment Division
v. Smith24 by mandating a return to Sherbert v. Verner?249 The usual
retort is to assert that the latter gambit expanded the scope of
judicially recognized rights while the hypothesized former one would
have constricted such rights. This is true only because we (justifiably)
assign no consequence to the loss of liberty experienced by racist
bigots and (less justifiably) think the loss of local political autonomy
resulting from RFRA is of less consequence than the increased
freedom of religious adherents to thumb their nose at secular laws
that happen to impinge upon their practices. The reality is that it is
often not easy to know whether any given legislative restructuring of
a judicially defined right expands or contracts that shadowy,
amorphous thing known as "liberty."
Claims of expanded liberty rest ultimately upon the concept of
"underenforced" norms, the idea that courts are institutionally ill-
suited to define constitutional rights as broadly as the constitutional
right might support2 0  Supporters of this approach readily
245. For a complete explication of the differences between original intention and
original meaning, see Randy Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV.
611 (1999).
246. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
247. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
248. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
249. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
250. The origin of this concept is Lawrence Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978). See also Richard
Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Foreword" Implementing the Constitution, 111
HARV. L. REV. 54, 75-106 (1997) (describing doctrine that invalidates only a portion of
behavior that might be thought unconstitutional under the right invoked); Evan
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acknowledge that this concept depends upon a gap between fights as
applied by courts and rights in the abstract.25 ' But how are we to
know the precise delineation of "fights in the abstract"? Of what,
abstractly defined, does equal protection consist? The concept of
equal protection acquires useful life only once we start to ask some of
the doctrinal questions: What purpose is served by differential
treatment? Is the purpose legitimate? Is the classification adequately
suited to accomplishment of the purpose? The idea that there is an
abstract ideal of any given fight is puzzling, especially in this highly
relativist post-modern age in which we doubt all verities, or even the
concept of truth. Why are constitutional rights an exception to this
cultural skepticism? What epistemological process enables
commentators (or Congress) to discern with clarity the pure and
abstract form of any fight in question? Congress views equal
protection one way, the Court views it differently. If you doubt that
there is some pure, "true" version of a fight the question then
becomes simply: Which version will prevail and who will decide? For
over two hundred years-from Marbury through Cooper v. Aaron to
today-we have accepted the Court as the institution that defines
constitutional rights. This tradition is rooted not in blind obeisance to
the past but in the Constitution's purpose of restraining popular
majorities. Even though the Fourteenth Amendment is directed to
states, not the federal government, the content of Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees (particularly due process and equal
protection) is identical as applied to states and the federal
government. Given that, is it really appropriate to allow Congress a
free hand in defining the guarantees that restrain Congress?
Moreover, the contention that Congress should possess either an
ontological power to define (and make stick) what constitutes
constitutional rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment' or an
epistemological power to raise a judicial presumption in favor of
congressional definitions of such rights,' fails to account adequately
for the dual function played by the Court's doctrine in this area.
First, judicial oversight is limited to the means employed by
Congress-congruence with and proportionality to a demonstrated
factual pattern of constitutional wrongdoing by state actors."" The
Caminker, Note, A Norm-Based Remedial Model for Underinclusive Statutes, 95 Yale LJ.
1185, 1192 (1986) (claiming that judicial doctrine often treats as "unconstitutional only a
subset of legislative actions which contravene the norm motivating the doctrine").
251. See, e.g., Caminker, Means-Ends Constraints, supra note 240, at 1169-78.
252. See Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 238, at 824.
253. Id.
254. In Garrett, for example, the Court did not question the legitimacy of a
congressional objective to prohibit what Congress considered irrational discrimination
against the disabled. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
[Vol. 53
Court has not indicated any willingness to scrutinize the congressional
objective, save for the requirement derived from the Fourteenth
Amendment itself that Congress act only to remedy constitutional
violations. Moreover, with respect to state action that bears a heavy
presumption of constitutional invalidity (e.g., racial discrimination or
establishment of an official state religion) the burden that Congress
needs to surmount is reduced, as is exemplified by the 1965 Voting
Rights Act. But when Congress seeks to regulate state action that is
presumptively lawful (e.g., rational discrimination on the basis of age
or disability) its burden is appropriately and correspondingly
increased, because the actions Congress seeks to outlaw through use
of a power limited to redress of certain unconstitutional behavior are
themselves presumptively outside the scope of the regulatory
authority invoked. State action that is clothed with a mild
presumption of invalidity (e.g., sex discrimination) occupies the
nether world in between and will predictably generate litigation that
will be decided on the nuance of the individual controversy. There is
surely far more latitude for Congress to forbid states to engage in sex
discrimination in employment than for Congress to provide a federal
civil remedy for the victims of sex-motivated violence because the
former forbidden conduct is far less likely to be substantially related
to an important state interest than is the absence of a federal civil
cause of action for actions already subject to civil and criminal
liability under state laws.
Judicial review of the enforcement power serves two important
functions: preservation of the institutional role of the judiciary as the
primary interpreter of the Constitution, and preservation of the
individual liberty and collective autonomy values of federalism. In
our rush to use the Constitution as the vehicle to address all manner
of perceived unfairness we tend to forget that the Fourteenth
Rather, the Court focused on the means chosen by Congress to reach this goal and to
assess those means it examined the evidence before Congress that states were in fact
engaging in such irrational discrimination. While the Court refused to consider evidence
that political subdivisions of a state had engaged in irrational discrimination against the
disabled because those actors enjoyed no Eleventh Amendment immunity, see id. at 369-
70, the implication of that selective review is that evidence of constitutional violations by
any state actor is relevant to the scope of Congress's enforcement power when Congress is
invoking that power for some purpose other than abrogation of state sovereign immunity.
Such evidence, for example, would be relevant to determine whether Congress could
invoke its enforcement power to bar irrational discrimination by states against the
disabled, so long as the remedy for state violations does not consist of private suits for
damages. Citizens could enforce such state obligations by injunctive relief and the United
States could independently enforce such obligations. Garrett suggests that a broader array
of evidence will be germane to assessing the legitimacy of exercise of the enforcement
power in a context other than abrogation of state sovereign immunity, a point that is vastly
underappreciated in the commentary upon the Flores progeny.
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Amendment bars only certain state actions. And the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment's constitutional liberties preserved from
government invasion is not a matter of legislative grace; it is a matter
of constitutional law, the domain of the courts ever since Marbury.2"
To recognize a congressional power to define for itself what
constitutes constitutional wrongdoing would be to surrender a basic
premise of our constitutional democracy-that the legislatures cannot
be entrusted to determine the scope of the liberties that constitutional
law preserves from their invasion.
You may well be inclined to join Justice Brennan in replying that
the "sponsors and supporters of the [Fourteenth] Amendment were
primarily interested in augmenting the power of Congress,"26 and
thus it is inconsistent with their intentions to limit congressional
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. But surely nobody
contends that there are no limits at all to Congress's enforcement
power. Justice Brennan offered his "ratchet footnote" in Katzenbach
255. Of course, the question of whether the courts are the exclusive arbiters of the
Constitution continues to produce debate. In the area of individual liberties the Court has
made its most emphatic claims of exclusive authority. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S.
1 (1958), in which the Court stated that Marbury "declared the basic principle that the
federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that
principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and
indispensable feature of our constitutional system." Id. at 18. Lest there be any doubt
what the Court meant by "the law of the Constitution" the Court claimed that "[i]t follows
that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court... is the
supreme law of the land." Id. Edwin Meese III, while he was Attorney General,
responded as follows:
[T]he Constitution and constitutional law.., are not synonymous....
... The Constitution [is], in its own words, "the supreme Law of the Land."...
[Constitutional law is what the Supreme Court says about the Constitution in its
decisions resolving the cases and controversies that come before it....
[ A] constitutional decision by the Supreme Court... binds the parties in a
case and also the executive branch for whatever enforcement is necessary. But
such a decision does not establish a supreme law of the land that is binding on all
persons and parts of government henceforth and forevermore....
.. The Supreme Court would face quite a dilemma if its own constitutional
decisions really were the supreme law of the land .... for then the Court would
not be able to change its mind. It could not overrule itself in a constitutional
case. Yet... the Court has done so on numerous occasions....
... [Constitutional interpretation is not the business of the Court only, but also
properly the business of all branches of government.
The Supreme Court... is not the only interpreter of the Constitution. Each of
the three coordinate branches of government... has a duty to interpret the
Constitution in the performance of its official functions.
Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 981-83, 985-86 (1987).
256. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648, n. 7 (1966).
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v. Morgan 2 7 as an adequate judicial limit, but there are several
problems with this resolution. First, when are constitutional liberties
such as equal protection diluted rather than expanded? This is not
unlike the now-rejected idea that "benign" racial classifications
warrant reduced judicial scrutiny. Second, if Congress can expand
constitutional liberties beyond their judicially recognized dimensions
what generally applicable principle prevents Congress from
contracting those liberties? And even if we dispense with generally
applicable principles and rely simply on the "ratchet footnote," is
Congress thereby foreclosed from repealing legislative expansions of
equal protection or due process, or does the ratchet principle only
apply when Congress seeks to shrink such liberties below the floor
established by the Court? Third, and perhaps most important, Justice
Brennan's resolution concedes to Congress the power to amend the
Constitution by ordinary legislation.2
The other major criticism of the Flores test is that the Court has
imposed a more stringent means-ends test upon congressional
exercise of its section 5 enforcement power than it has upon other
implementing powers of Congress, particularly the "necessary and
proper" clause and section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment.*29 These
criticisms rest upon two observations: (1) that the intention of the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment was to vest Congress with an
enforcement power identical to its implementation power under the
necessary and proper clause, and (2) that the linguistic similarities
between these implementing powers argues for a parallel
interpretation. Neither observation is sufficient to persuade.
While there is little doubt that influential members of the Thirty-
ninth Congress thought that section 5 would endow Congress with an
implementing power identical to its "necessary and proper" power,260
it is also true that the same Congress specifically rejected the
following implementing power, phrased explicitly in terms of the
necessary and proper clause, that would have given Congress a
plenary power:
257. Id. at 651 n.10.
258. This criticism was made by the younger Justice Harlan in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112,205 (1970):
Congress is subject to none of the institutional restraints imposed on judicial
decisionmaking; it is controlled only by the political process. In Article V, the
Framers expressed the view that the political restraints alone were an insufficient
control over the process of constitution making.... To allow a simple majority of
Congress to have final say on matters of constitutional interpretation is therefore
fundamentally out of keeping with the constitutional structure.
259. The most extended version of this criticism is Caminker, Means-Ends Constraints,
supra note 240.
260. See, e.g., Caminker, Means-Ends Constraints, supra note 240, at 1159 n.164.
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The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, and to all
persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life,
liberty, and property.26'
This version of an enforcement power would have eliminated the
state action requirement and given Congress authority to do whatever
it might think reasonable to secure equal protection. It may well be
that this was rejected because it eliminated the state action
requirement, or because it gave Congress a substantive power to
decide the meaning of equal protection and privileges and
immunities, or because it gave Congress broader authority to
implement the Fourteenth Amendment than Congress thought wise.
But given its explicit use of the "necessary and proper" phrase and
Congress's rejection of that locution, it is reasonable to doubt that the
case has been persuasively made that Congress intended section 5 to
incorporate a "necessary and proper" power.
As discussed earlier, the linguistic similarities between section 5
and section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment mask the real substantive
differences of the two amendments, differences that support
significantly different enforcement authority. The same observation
is true with respect to the necessary and proper implementation
power. Broad authority by Congress to select means necessary and
proper to implement its delegated powers expands the power of
Congress to displace contrary exercises of state legislative power, but
exercise of this federal authority does not invariably require states to
conform to federally specified norms. Congressional authority
exercised under the necessary and proper clause is authority
exercised generally upon private persons, not upon the states as
governmental units. Even when such power does validly extend to
the states, the states are required to conform to a federal policy that is
not constitutionally required. Under a section 5 power coterminous
with the necessary and proper clause, however, the states would be
required to conform with Congress's sense of a constitutional norm.
Given the flaccid level of judicial review that applies to the scope of
the delegated powers that Congress may implement through the
necessary and proper clause, it is appropriate to give equally
deferential review to the implementation power. But the level of
judicial review that applies to the substantive guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment is substantially greater, and it thus makes
sense to tie the level of judicial review of the Fourteenth
Amendment's implementation power to the level of review of the
substantive guarantees. Of course, to the extent that the Court
261. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866).
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reinvigorates its level of review of the scope of the delegated powers
of Congress, it may be necessary to reexamine this issue.
Moreover, the Court's congruence and proportionality limits on
the enforcement power serve to preserve individual liberty and
collective autonomy. It is axiomatic that neither the citizens of the
nation as a whole, acting through Congress, nor the citizens of a state,
acting through their state agents of government, are free to deny their
fellow citizens any of our familiar constitutional liberties. But when
constitutionally guaranteed rights are not at issue there is no a priori
reason to privilege federal action ostensibly undertaken to redress
constitutional violations. On such issues as providing legal protection
against discrimination based on age, disability, or sexual orientation, a
conflict is apt to develop between those who see such legislation as
protective of individual liberty and those who see it as invasive of
individual liberty. As long as constitutional rights are not at stake,
and it is up to the judiciary to declare that they are at stake, this
conflict between liberty as freedom from government and liberty as
freedom through government often resolves into a conflict between a
state polity that sees liberty as the former and a national polity that
sees it as the latter. (But, of course, these views could be, and
sometimes are, reversed.) Because there is no constitutionally
guaranteed individual liberty to be free of, say, rational age
discrimination, the question is whether the federal government has
the authority to use its power to remedy constitutional wrongdoing in
order to outlaw constitutionally valid practices that may be desired by
the citizens of some unknown number of states. By allowing the
citizens of the states to exercise their individual choice about domicile
and their collective autonomy to decide policies that do not implicate
constitutional liberties, the Court has advanced these values of
federalism as well as preserving the judicial role to say what the
Constitution means.
Nor is Morrison's reiteration of the state action requirement as a
limitation on the section 5 enforcement power a blow to the ability of
Congress to enforce constitutional liberties. When Congress uses its
section 5 power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment it must act
with respect to identified state action, but this does not necessarily
mean that the remedy must be limited exclusively to state actors.
Suppose that Congress provided that any state actor proven to have
engaged in sex discrimination in investigating or prosecuting crimes
of sex-based violence would be subject to civil and criminal sanctions,
and that the victim of sex-based violence in such a case would also
have a federal tort remedy against the perpetrator. Would Morrison
render such legislation unenforceable? I do not believe so. Or
suppose that Congress identified six states in which crimes of sexual
violence were habitually neither investigated nor prosecuted. Would
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Morrison be any barrier to federal legislation invoking the
enforcement power to make crimes of sexual violence in those
identified states a federal offense and afford the victims of such
crimes a civil remedy? Again, I do not believe so.
E. Ignoring the Presumption Against Preemption
Whenever Congress legislates in areas in which states also have
power to act the question of preemption arises. Congress may
expressly preempt state law, but then there can be debate about the
scope of the preemption, or even whether Congress's "express"
intention to preempt state law is clear enough to constitute express
preemption. When Congress does not act expressly to preempt state
law, the question becomes one of implied preemption. Congress's
intention to preempt is implied from what it actually did. The usual
questions are to ask whether the federal law operates to occupy an
entire field of regulation, or whether it conflicts with state law. It is
familiar doctrine that in each preemption case the question "is what
the purpose of Congress was. [When Congress legislates] in a field
which the States have traditionally occupied... we start with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to
be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress." '262 When a federal statute contains an
express preemption provision the courts turn first to "the plain
wording of [the statute], which necessarily contains the best evidence
of Congress's preemptive intent.""2 3  When the issue is whether
Congress impliedly preempted state law the burden is on the party
urging preemption to show either that Congress intended federal law
to occupy a field exclusively2,, or that state law is in actual conflict
with federal law. Conflict preemption exists when either it is
impossible to comply with both state and federal law265 or state law
"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress."26
The presumption against preemption is not a mere canon of
statutory construction; it is a substantive canon of constitutional
interpretation. As Justice Stevens is prone to observe, preemption
cases are cases about federalism.267 More particularly, they are about
262. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,230 (1947). See also Medtronic, Inc.
v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,485 (1996).
263. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993).
264. See, e.g., English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72,78-79 (1990).
265. See, e.g., McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913).
266. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). See also Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick,
514 U.S. 280,287 (1995).
267. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 887 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,726 (1991).
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the process of federalism, and a sampling of recent preemption cases
suggests that while the Court may be creating one brand of process
federalism when the scope of the commerce clause is at issue it is
engaged in a distinctly different brand when preemption is afoot.
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co."' involved a tort claim
against American Honda by a driver of a 1987 Honda Accord injured
in an auto accident. The Accord was not equipped with a driver's
side airbag and Geier claimed that Honda was negligent in failing so
to equip the car. Honda claimed that its compliance with an interim
Department of Transportation regulation that required it to equip
some of its models (but not the 1987 Accord) with airbags insulated it
from liability by reason of the regulation's preemption of state tort
law. The Court ruled that the statute under which DOT had
promulgated the airbag regulation at issue did not expressly preempt
state tort law269 but concluded that the possibility of state tort liability
for the lack of an airbag posed such an obstacle to the
accomplishment of Congress's objectives that such state tort law was
in actual conflict with DOT's airbag regulation. Congress's objective
in the underlying statute was "to reduce traffic accidents and deaths
and injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents.""27 The statute
authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to promulgate minimum
safety standards. Over time, the Secretary did so, and DOT's Safety
Standard 208, which dealt with "occupant crash protection" went
through a series of changes, each with the aim of forcing auto
manufacturers to produce vehicles with some form of passive
restraint system that would force unwilling occupants to use seatbelts
or obtain roughly equivalent protection."I Because auto users
detested automatic seatbelts, ignition interlock devices,2 continuous
buzzer warnings of unsecured seatbelts, and other intrusive systems,
the Secretary began to encourage auto manufacturers to install
relatively expensive airbags on some models as a prelude to a
requirement that all autos include airbags. Interim Safety Standard
208, at issue in Geier, provided auto manufacturers with a variety of
methods to overcome public reluctance to wear seatbelts and thus
improve passenger safety through "passive restraint" devices that
268. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
269. Id at 867-68. The operative statute was the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. (1988) (recodified at 49 U.S.C. § 30101 et seq.
(1997)). The operative regulation was known as Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
208 (FMVSS 208).
270. 15 U.S.C. §1381 (1988).
271. Geier, 529 U.S. at 875-77.
272. An ignition interlock is a device that prevents engine ignition until the driver's
seatbelt is fastened.
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would not encounter public resistance, mostly but not entirely
airbags. 3
Even though the presumption against preemption imposes on the
party seeking to establish preemption the burden of proving a clear
and manifest intent of Congress to preempt contrary state law, the
majority of the Court concluded that the checkered history of Safety
Standard 208 indicated that the Department of Transportation had as
its objective a gradual phasing in of airbags, an objective that would
be frustrated by a state's imposition of tort liability on an auto
manufacturer who complied with Safety Standard 208 by
manufacturing a vehicle without an airbag. 4 This is more than a little
remarkable. First, conflict preemption is not normally to be found
where the conflict is between state law and a general, broad, or
abstract federal objective. Thus, in Commonwealth Edison Co. v.
Montana,25 the Court found no conflict between Montana's
substantial severance tax on coal, which admittedly made coal more
expensive to the electrical generation utilities that use it, and a variety
of federal laws that specifically have as their objective the production
and consumption of coal. The federal objectives in Safety Standard
208 are hardly any more specific; indeed, the tortured history of the
standard suggests agency vacillation as to what sort of polices ought
to be adopted to protect auto users who stubbornly refuse to do the
sensible thing and buckle their seat belts. Nothing whatsoever in that
history indicates any concern about the possibility of state tort law
interfering with these efforts. Second, the federal objective identified
by the Court in Geier was an agency objective, not a congressional
objective. A string of prior cases suggests that the presumption
against preemption has special force when the federal norm that
allegedly preempts state law is an agency rule.276 This is true whether
one subscribes to the politically enforceable or judicially enforceable
brand of federalism. From the political perspective, "[u]nlike
Congress, administrative agencies are clearly not designed to
represent the interests of States, yet with relative ease they can
promulgate comprehensive and detailed regulations that have broad
273. 529 U.S. at 878-79.
274. Id. at 881-83.
275. 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
276. See Cal. Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 583 (1987)
(administrative regulations should "declare any intention to preempt state law with some
specificity"); Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 717-18
(1985) (preemption of state law by federal agency rules poses special federalism concerns,
such that they should "make their intentions clear if they intend for their regulations to be
exclusive"); Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 154 (1982)
(preemption of state law by federal agency rules occurs when the agency "promulgates
regulations intended to preempt state law").
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preemption ramifications for state law."2'  From the judicial
perspective, the values of federalism are more endangered by
politically unaccountable agency administrators that are concerned
entirely about their narrow bailiwick than by politically accountable
members of Congress. One would think that a Court concerned with
federalism would be especially sensitive to these matters and find the
presumption against preemption particularly applicable when agency
regulations are at issue. Finally, there is some reason to wonder
whether the entire species of obstacle preemption is really warranted.
It has been persuasively argued that the Supremacy Clause supports
preemption "if and only if state law contradicts a valid rule
established by federal law, and the mere fact that the federal law
serves certain purposes does not automatically mean that it
contradicts everything that might get in the way of those purposes. '
Yet, one need not eliminate the "obstacle" branch of conflict
preemption to heed this admonition. It was precisely for these
reasons that Commonwealth Edison v. Montana ' limited obstacle
conflict preemption to cases where state law poses a sharp,
unavoidable conflict with a specific federal purpose. The Court's
virtual abandonment of these principles in Geier cannot fail to cause
one to wonder about the nature of the Court's commitment to a
judicially enforceable federalism.
In United States v. Locke,2" the Court held that Washington
State's regulations of oil tankers plying its waters were impliedly
preempted by a series of federal laws regulating similar but not
identical aspects of tanker traffic in American waters. Washington
had adopted rules governing tanker navigation procedures, crew
training and procedures, and reporting of casualty incidents. The
Court held that federal law had impliedly preempted the entire field
of design, construction, equipping, and operation of oil tankers, and
that conflict preemption applied to the narrow area of state
regulation of matters peculiar to local waters, such as depth or
narrowness of marine passages. The Court catalogued a series of
federal statutes, treaties, and international agreements that, taken
together, indicated a congressional intent to occupy the entire field of
tanker design, construction, and operation.' The important aspect of
Locke was that the Court firmly rejected any suggestion that the
presumption against preemption should apply at all when "the State
277. Geier, 529 U.S. at 949 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
278. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225,231-232 (2000).
279. 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
280. Geier, 529 U.S. 89 (2000).
281. Id. at 99-103.
January 2002] FEDERALISM
regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant
federal presence."''
This rejection of the presumption against preemption has a
certain bootstrap quality to it. In a field preemption case the entire
inquiry is to decide whether what Congress has done is sufficiently
pervasive to constitute an implicit declaration that no other
regulation of the area is to be allowed. But a large part of this inquiry
is to chart the boundaries of the field. The presumption against
preemption works to hem in the field boundaries and prevent judges
from deciding that the field is so vast as to be virtually limitless. If the
presumption drops away as soon as Congress embarks upon
significant regulation there is no effective judicial check upon the
perimeters of the regulated field. That the result in Locke was
sensible and one that should have been reached even if the
presumption against preemption applied does not alter the potentially
disturbing effect of the Court's method.' No doubt Congress has
power to occupy an entire field within its enumerated powers and
thoroughly oust the states from any regulatory role in that field, but
the presumption against preemption has a useful role to play in
addition to causing judges to consider carefully the scope of the
implied field. Field preemption can produce a regulatory vacuum
when the federal scheme fails to address some particular point that
may be of concern to a state. Of course, Congress can correct that
oversight but it may de disinclined to do so if the vacuum is of
consequence only to one or two states. The federalism value of
collective autonomy is enhanced by a cautious application of field
preemption. Continued use of the presumption against preemption in
field preemption cases would promote that end.
In Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, the Court held that the
federal ERISA statute expressly preempted a Washington law
providing that the designation of a spouse as the beneficiary of a non-
probate asset is automatically revoked upon divorce. David Egelhoff
had made Donna Egelhoff, his wife, the beneficiary of a life insurance
282. Id. at 108.
283. Washington had imposed a crew training requirement that did "not address
matters unique to the waters of Puget Sound [but that imposed] requirements that control
the staffing, operation, and manning of a tanker outside of Washington's waters." 11 at
113. Washington also imposed an "English language proficiency requirement on a
tanker's crew, [a requirement that dictated] how a tanker operator staffs the vessel even
from the outset of the voyage, when the vessel may be thousands of miles from Puget
Sound." Id. Finally, Washington imposed a navigation watch requirement "not tied to the
peculiarities of Puget Sound; it applies throughout Washington's waters and at all times."
Id. at 114.
284. 532 U.S. 141, 121 S.Ct.1322 (2001).
285. ERISA is the acronym for the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
88 Stat. 832,29 U.S.C. § 1001 etseq. (1994).
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policy provided him by Boeing, his employer, and which was
governed by ERISA. David and Donna divorced and two months
later David died intestate after he was injured in an auto accident.
Although Donna was still the named beneficiary of the Boeing life
insurance policy, David's statutory heirs (his children by a prior
marriage) argued that they were the beneficiaries by reason of the
Washington statute revoking the designation of Donna as the
insurance beneficiary upon David and Donna's divorce. The Court
ruled that the provision of ERISA that states that ERISA "shall
supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan" covered by ERISA2 was a
sufficiently clear expression of congressional intent to overcome the
presumption against preemption. Four justices thought that the
"relate to" language of ERISA should be construed only as a
"reference to our established jurisprudence concerning conflict and
field pre-emption, "" and two of them thought that even under those
doctrines of implied preemption the Washington law was not
preempted. The majority acknowledged the applicability of the
"presumption against pre-emption in areas of traditional state
regulation such as family law" but summarily dismissed it because
"Congress had made clear its desire for pre-emption."m That clarity
was not discernible to Justices Breyer and Stevens, who asserted that
"[n]o one could claim that ERISA pre-empts the entire field of state
law governing inheritance-though such matters 'relate to' ERISA,
broadly speaking. Neither is there any direct conflict between the
Washington statute and ERISA, for the one nowhere directly
contradicts the other."2'° Indeed, the Washington law "is a rule of
interpretation, and it is designed to carry out, not to conflict with, the
employee's likely intention as revealed in the plan documents." 291
This was because the Washington rule treats the divorced beneficiary
spouse "as if" he or she had predeceased the decedent unless the
"instrument governing disposition of the nonprobate asset expressly
provides othervise." 9 Egelhoff's Boeing insurance plan was "silent
about what occurs when a beneficiary designation is invalid" and so
286. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
287. Egelhoff, 121 S.Ct. at 1330 (Scalia, J., concurring). See also id. at 1331 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) ("Like Justice Scalia, I believe that we should apply normal conflict pre-
emption and field pre-emption principles where, as here, a state statute covers ERISA and
non-ERISA documents alike").
288. Id. at 1330.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 1331 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
291. Id.
292. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.07.010(2)(b)(i) (1998).
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the Washington statute merely filled that gap.29 The dissent pointed
out the many instances in which resort to the background state law of
property or inheritance is essential to determine whether "a given
name makes a designation that is, or has become, invalid"'2 and
noted that such reference to state law "cannot possibly create any
direct conflict with the plan documents., 295  The more serious
preemption claim was that the state law might pose a case of obstacle
conflict preemption, but the dissenters applied the presumption
against preemption and concluded that because "the only damage to
federal interests [was] the added administrative burden the state
statute imposes upon ERISA plan administrators," '296 there was
insufficient evidence to overcome the presumption. Moreover, the
Washington law, and other state laws like it, reinforce ERISA's
ultimate objective of fair protection of employee benefits. By finding
preemption the Court ignored the fact that the divorced ex-spouse
had already received half the community property of the marriage
and would receive, by virtue of preemption's displacement of the
Washington revocation statute, property already awarded to the
decedent spouse in the marital dissolution.
The majority's approach to preemption in Egelhoff was
apallingly wooden: its analysis was so simplistic that one risks
hyperbole in labeling it analysis. Most puzzling, though, was the
Court's evident insensitivity to the federalism-based presumption
against preemption. It is hard to understand why Justices who are so
aware of the values of federalism in Lopez, Morrison, or Garrett
exhibit such blindness to those values when presented with a
preemption case. Given the broad range of issues over which
Congress has undoubted power to regulate, the failure of the Court to
apply preemption doctrine sparingly, and with real attention both to
Congress's intent and the values of federalism, will in the long run
prove disastrous to perpetuation of the very real values underlying
the diffusion of power inherent in federalism. To those of us who
care about federalism as an end in itself, rather than as an expedient
means to accomplishment of other policy objectives, this failing of the
Court is distressing.
To compound the preemption mess, the Court uses preemption
to avoid issues that might better be resolved on other constitutional
grounds. In Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council7' the Court
ducked clarification of the scope of a state's power to regulate matters
293. Egelhoff, 121 S. Ct. at 1331 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
294. Id. at 1332 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
295. Id.
296. Id. at 1333 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
297. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
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that have an impact on foreign affairs by reliance on preemption
instead. After Massachusetts enacted a law generally barring state
agencies from purchasing goods or services from companies doing
business with Burma, Congress enacted a statute that authorized the
President to impose similar economic sanctions against Burma and to
lift those sanctions if Burma should substantially improve its human
rights practices and commitment to democratic governance, or if
American national security should so dictate. In Crosby the Court
ruled that the Massachusetts law was impliedly preempted because
the state law was an obstacle to the accomplishment of the intended
purpose and natural effect of the federal law in three ways: (1) the
state law undermined presidential discretion to lift sanctions, (2)
interfered with the congressional decision to limit economic pressure
against Burma to a specific range, and (3) was at odds with the
President's authority to speak for the nation in formulating an
international strategy to deal with Burma.
In Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly,29 the Court ruled that
Massachusetts regulations banning cigarette advertising within 1000
feet of a school or playground were preempted by the federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, which provides that "no
requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be
imposed under state law with respect to the advertising or promotion
of any cigarettes" that bear the warning labels prescribed by federal
law? In concluding that Congress had expressly preempted state
ability to regulate cigarette advertising, the Court denied any
distinction between regulations addressing the content of such
advertising and those directed to the location of cigarette
advertisements.
Crosby and Lorillard Tobacco illustrate a dysfunctional quality
to the Court's current federalism jurisprudence. Rather than
confronting directly the scope of the states' power to touch upon
matters of foreign affairs, the Court in Crosby employed a rationale
for preemption that could as easily have been used to elaborate upon
the substantive line drawn by Zschernig v. Miller°Wand Barclay's Bank
v. Franchise Tax Board.3 As a result, the decision enhanced the
scope of federal power twice-once by expanding the scope of
obstacle conflict preemption and again by using a rationale that
effectively draws a firmer line against state regulation of issues
touching upon an articulated federal foreign policy. While there may
298. 121 S. Ct. 2404 (2001).
299. 79 Stat. 282 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq. (1998)).
300. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1998).
301. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
302. 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
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be nothing objectionable to the result in Crosby, one is left wondering
whether in the absence of federal legislation dealing with Burma a
state could bar the use of state funds to purchase goods made in
Burma. If the answer is that a state could not so act, one must
wonder why it was necessary to use preemption as the vehicle to chart
the boundary between federal and state power. In Lorillard Tobacco,
the issue was really the extent of free speech protection for
commercial advertising of a dangerous but legal product. The use of
preemption to avoid deciding the issue with respect to cigarette
advertising enhanced federal power at the expense of collective
autonomy. Invalidation of the Massachusetts limits on such
advertising may well be the correct judgment, but only if the First
Amendment compels the result and that is precisely what the Court
refused to tell us with respect to cigarette advertising.
33
The Court's cavalier treatment of the presumption against
preemption does not arise from a view that such a presumption is
misplaced. Professor Caleb Nelson has argued that such a
presumption is insupportable, given the deliberate inclusion within
the Supremacy Clause of a non obstante clause that directs courts to
refrain from efforts to harmonize federal law with pre-existing state
law,30 but neither the Court as a whole or any single justice has ever
indicated any agreement with that position. However, because the
Court's actions could suggest sub silentio agreement with Professor
Nelson's argument, some examination of his thesis may be
appropriate.
Nelson argues that the final phrase of the Supremacy Clause-
"any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding '" 5-was intended to operate in like fashion as a
statutory non obstante clause. Just as a statutory non obstante clause
would instruct judges not to apply the presumption against implied
repeal of earlier statutes that might be in partial conflict with the new
legislation, the Supremacy Clause's non obstante provision was
intended to instruct judges that they need not interpret federal law
(which operates to repeal contrary state law) to harmonize with prior
state law.3 The Supremacy Clause, according to Nelson, established
303. Of course, the Court did decide the free speech issue in the context of smokeless
tobacco and cigars, items not covered by the federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act. Applying the conventional four-part Central Hudson test the Court found that the
prohibitions were not sufficiently closely tailored to the objective of the regulations-
discouraging tobacco use by minors-to survive constitutional scrutiny. See Lorillard
Tobacco, 121 S. Ct. at 2407-08.
304. See Nelson, supra note 278, at 290-303.
305. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
306. See Nelson, supra note 278, at 232 ("The non obstante provision tells courts that
even if a particular interpretation of a federal statute would [preempt] some state laws,
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a rule of applicability, "making clear that federal law applies even in
state courts;"30 a rule of priority-making clear that federal law
trumped state law even if the state law was enacted later;308 and a rule
of construction-making clear that courts should not "apply the
traditional presumption against implied repeals in determining
whether federal law contradicts state law.""' Nelson concludes that
the Supremacy Clause establishes a "logical contradiction" test:
"Courts are required to disregard state law if, but only if, it
contradicts a rule validly established by federal law. 33 This is not the
same as the physically impossible branch of conflict preemption;
rather, it encompasses any substantive or jurisdictional conflict
between state and federal law.311  From this, Nelson reasons that
obstacle conflict preemption is wholly unwarranted, either as a matter
of constitutional law3' or statutory interpretation, 313 and that the
presumption against preemption is equally unwarranted, due to its
conflict with the Supremacy Clause's non obstante instruction. 4
Professor Nelson's argument is elegant, well-reasoned, and
persuasive within its limits, but it is the limits of the argument that
matter most. It may be the case that a presumption against
preemption is not warranted by reference to the Supremacy Clause,
but that does not eliminate the possibility that such a presumption is
fairly grounded in other equally strong constitutional principles. The
Supremacy Clause is an indispensable feature of our federal system,
but so is the concept of enumerated, limited sources of federal power
with residual power lying in the states. A presumption against a
finding of implied preemption (which Professor Nelson finds
unobjectionable315) simply operates to ensure that there are sound,
persuasive reasons to conclude that Congress intended to preempt
state law. A presumption against a broad reading of federal law that
purports to preempt state law expressly (which Professor Nelson finds
objectionable) serves a different function. Like other "clear
statement" rules it operates to ensure that the federal political
process has focused upon the displacement of state authority before it
this fact is not automatically reason to prefer different interpretation. It follows that
courts should not automatically seek 'narrowing' constructions of federal statutes solely to
avoid preemption.")
307. Id at 246.
308. Id at 250.
309. Id. at 255.
310. Id at 260.
311. Id at 260-64.
312. Id at 265-76.
313. Id. at 276-90.
314. Id. at 290-303.
315. Id. at 293.
316. Id. at 293-98.
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acts to do so. Without such a rule there is no assurance that in fact
Congress has attended to the consequences of displacing state
authority. This holds true whether one subscribes to the Garcia
brand of process federalism or the Gregory/New York/Printz brand.
Adherents to Garcia argue that "to give the state-displacing weight of
federal law to mere constitutional ambiguity would evade the very
procedure for lawmaking on which Garcia relied to protect states'
interests.""' Adherents to the Gregory/New York/Printz version of
process federalism combine that desire for a clear statement of
congressional intent with inspection of the substance of federal law to
determine whether it operates improperly to invade the states'
autonomous governance process.
The presumption against preemption, properly and consistently
applied, would not deprive Congress of any power it has to formulate
law and make it supreme by displacing state law. But in order to do
so Congress should be required to make unequivocally clear its intent
to displace the state law in question. Without such an unequivocal
statement the courts should interpret the federal law to effectuate its
purpose while leaving intact as much state law as can be retained
without vitiating the federal purpose."' Egelhoff provides a useful
example. In ERISA Congress expressly preempted state laws
"insofar as they now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan" covered by ERISA. But the "relate to" language is hardly a
model of precision. It could be taken to refer to any law, however
tangential, that bears upon any aspect of a transaction included within
a covered plan; or it could refer to the Court's established implied
preemption doctrine (as four justices thought it did); or it could refer
to those state laws that bear upon matters of central significance to
covered employee benefit plans. The problem, of course, is that
Congress expressed itself badly, even while purporting to engage in
express preemption. This is the paradigmatic case for applying the
presumption against preemption: Not only did Congress fail to make
it unequivocally clear what state law it meant to preempt, the purpose
of the federal law would be enhanced, not undercut, by a construction
of federal law that would leave intact the state revocation statute that,
in most instances, would have no impact at all upon employee benefit
plans covered by ERISA. But the Court would have none of this;
rather, a majority composed of those justices who say they are most
sensitive to federalism values preferred instead to read Congress's
opaque expression as if it were a clear direction.
317. 1 LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1176 (3d ed. 2000).
318. Even Professor Nelson agrees in part with this contention. See Nelson, supra note
278, at 295-98.
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F. Erosion of the Independence of State Law
The adequate and independent state grounds doctrine is the
clearest demarcation of the independence of state law. As the Court
said in Herb v. Pitcairn,319 "[t]his Court from the time of its foundation
has adhered to the principle that it will not review judgments of state
courts that rest on adequate and independent state grounds.... Our
only power over state judgments is to correct them to the extent they
incorrectly adjudge federal rights."320 But federal and state rights are
not separate spheres. Of course, states may not diminish federal
rights (as, for example, by a constitutional provision prohibiting
abortions) but they may provide rights that are more generous than
under federal law (as, for example, by a constitutional provision
guaranteeing the right to a post-viability abortion). More curious is
the Court's increasing tendency to entwine state law with federal
constitutional law, a phenomenon that facially has nothing to do with
the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine but which, in
the application, tends to sap some of the independence of state law.
Let us begin with the modern view of the question of when a
state government has sufficiently deprived someone of property to
trigger the protection of procedural due process. Such cases as Board
of Regents v. Roth,32' Perry v. Sindermann,3 ' and Cleveland Board of
Education v. Loudermill establish that "[p]roperty interests are not
created by the Constitution [but] are created and.., defined by
existing rules and understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law."3 4 As a result, the availability of a federal
constitutional right is consigned to state discretion. In Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council.' the Court created a per se rule by which
government regulation of property could be identified as not a taking.
[R]egulations that prohibit all economically beneficial use of
land... cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without
compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions
that background principles of the State's law of property and
nuisance already place upon land ownership. A law or decree with
such an effect must.., do no more than duplicate the result that
could have been achieved.., by adjacent landowners... under the
State's law of private nuisance, or by the State under its
319. 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
320. ld. at 125-26.
321. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
322. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
323. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
324. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
325. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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complementarX power to abate nuisances that affect the public
generally ....
As a result, the Court implicitly asserted the power to review a
decision by a state's highest court that some state regulation barring
all economically beneficial use of a parcel of land is simply an
application of the state's "background principles" of nuisance law.
For example, if on remand the South Carolina Supreme Court had
ruled that the Beachfront Management Act, which barred Lucas from
building on his barrier island lots, was nothing more than a prosaic
application of South Carolina nuisance law, the United States
Supreme Court could have reviewed that judgment to determine
whether in fact South Carolina's Supreme Court had interpreted
South Carolina law correctly. The Court would claim the power to do
so because it would insist that the scope of South Carolina's nuisance
law is inseparable from the federal constitutional issue of whether a
taking has occurred. Lest that seem unduly breathtaking, that is
precisely the reading given Lucas by the plurality of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas in Bush v. Gore.27 And, of
course, in Bush v. Gore that plurality engaged in an extensive review
of Florida election law in order to determine whether the Florida
Supreme Court's interpretation of Florida law was fairly consistent
with the law that existed on election day 2000 or whether it
represented such a marked departure as to constitute new law. The
inquiry was necessitated, said the plurality, because Article II, section
1, clause 2 requires each state to appoint presidential electors "in such
Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct." Thus, the meaning of
Florida law was transformed from a state issue into a federal
constitutional issue, for if the Florida Supreme Court had remade
Florida's election law so as to constitute the appointment of electors
by the Florida Supreme Court it would have violated Article II of the
federal Constitution. Cynics may sneer and claim that Bush v. Gore
was all raw politics and no law"z but the fact is that three justices
engaged in a full-scale review of state law to determine a point of
federal constitutional law. This phenomenon is not confined to the
extraordinary circumstances of Bush v. Gore but occurs in more
prosaic cases as well.
In Rogers v. Tennessee,329 the Court examined the Tennessee
Supreme Court's retroactive application of its decision abolishing the
common law "year and a day rule," under which a criminal defendant
may not be convicted of murder unless the victim had died -within a
326. Id. at 1029.
327. 531 U.S. 98,115 n.1 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
328. See, e.g., ALAN DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE (2001).
329. 532 U.S. 451, 121 S. Ct. 1693 (2001).
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year and a day of the act. The Court concluded that the Tennessee
court had not violated due process by its retroactive application of its
decision, but to reach that decision the Court examined Tennessee
law to conclude that "the Tennessee court's abolition of the year and
a day rule was not unexpected and indefensible."3" That conclusion,
in turn, was driven by the Court's determination that "at the time of
petitioner's crime the year and a day rule had only the most tenuous
foothold as part of the criminal law of the State of Tennessee." '331 The
four dissenters also dissected Tennessee law, but for the purpose of
demonstrating that the Tennessee Supreme Court had changed the
law and that such change constituted a denial of due process because
it amounted to a "retroactive creation of crimes"3 2 and did not give
"'fair warning' of the impending retroactive change. 333
Whatever the merits of the result in Rogers, the method was not
the best. Far better for the values of federalism that the Court accept
the Tennessee Supreme Court's reading of Tennessee law and
evaluate that reading in terms of its consistency with due process, the
ex post facto clause, or both. If Tennessee's independent governance
system went awry and the Tennessee Supreme Court violated the
federal Constitution it is for the Court to say so, but the antecedent
question of the meaning of Tennessee law was for Tennessee to
determine.
In Bush v. Gore, the Court avoided this pitfall by relying on a
tailor-made theory of equal protection evidently designed to fit this
case only. The plurality's theory of the case raised the ineffable
question of when judicial interpretation of law becomes judicial
manufacture of law. Three of the four dissenters in Rogers-Justices
Stevens, Scalia, and Thomas-saw the same issue presented there: At
what point does common law judging turn into judicial legislating? It
is one of the ironies of the term that Justice Stevens would both
dissent in Bush v. Gore and join a dissent in Rogers that employed the
same method he abhorred in Bush v. Gore. In any case, the question
is better left unanswered for there is no answer, or at least no
satisfactory, plausible and persuasive answer, and thus no usable
answer.
All that the Court has done by tying federal rights to
interpretation of state law is to interfere unnecessarily in state
governance procedures. How ironic that a Court that has assiduously
crafted commerce power doctrine to create a zone of procedural
330. 121 S. Ct. at 1700-01.
331. Id at 1701. The Court relied in part on earlier cases applying a similar analysis.
See, e.g., Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964); NAACP v. Alabama ex reL
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
332. Rogers, 121 S.Ct. at 1709 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
333. Id
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immunity for states, a zone frankly designed to preserve state
governance autonomy, should be so tone deaf to the same theme in
other areas of constitutional law. Federalism is not confined to
judicial decision about the scope of the enumerated powers of
Congress; it is a consideration that is always present at the
intersection of state and federal authority, no matter in what quarter
of the Constitution that intersection may occur.
re.Conclusion: The Consequences of Doctrine Changed and
Doctrine Left Untouched
There are good reasons to maintain federalism and sound
reasons to think that the judiciary should be involved in the effort.
Federalism promotes individual liberty, collective autonomy, and
political responsibility through citizen involvement and accountability
to citizens. The maintenance of federalism is the responsibility of
everyone: the people, through direct action (such as voting) and
indirect action (such as informed monitoring of power allocation
issues and consideration of the consequences of those issues); the
Congress, through real deliberation of the scope of its powers and
sensitive consideration of the benefits of decentralization or
centralization with respect to any given issue; the states, through
education and lobbying of federal actors and responsible use of their
own powers; and the courts, through judicial review of federal
legislative or executive acts that may transcend the boundaries of the
powers delegated to those federal agents of the people.
For a time, federalism seemed to be heading into a realm where
it would be almost entirely politically enforceable, but the Court has
energetically undertaken the task of supplying judicial enforcement to
federalism. The effect of the Court's recent foray into judicially
enforceable federalism may be trifling, or it may be the leading edge
of a counter-revolution. It is too soon to be sure.
The commerce clause cases, Lopez and Morrison, are easily
evaded by use of the conditional spending power, or simply by
limiting the scope of legislation to activities involving an
instrumentality of interstate commerce, although the latter gambit
does indeed shrink somewhat the scope of the statutory coverage.
The commercial/non-commercial distinction serves only to divide
regulatory capacity along a new dimension, but does not wholly
deprive the federal government of regulatory capacity. While the
commerce cases are significant, they do not strike me as of
monumental consequence.
The process immunity cases are as easily avoided by express
preemption of state law over a field that is of concern to Congress
and within its regulatory authority. Congress might also engage in
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conditional preemption, giving states a choice of surrendering
regulatory authority altogether or regulating in a fashion that
Congress prescribes. To the extent that Congress uses these devices,
the process immunity cases will have had the ironic effect of
encouraging further elimination of state autonomy, precisely what in
his New York v. United States dissent Justice White predicted would
occur.
By limiting Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment to remedial action, the Court has significantly asserted
its power. First, in conjunction with Seminole Tribe it has
significantly trimmed congressional ability to abrogate the states'
sovereign immunity, although the states remain exposed to
injunctions and to enforcement actions by the United States itself.
Second, by tying the scope of the remedial power to the effective
level of judicial review of Fourteenth Amendment claims, the Court
has made it considerably more difficult for Congress to bar conduct
that is presumptively valid under the Fourteenth Amendment and
thus subject only to minimal judicial scrutiny. Congress may still do
so but its burden of proof of a constitutional violation is now
heightened, and the onus is on Congress to demonstrate that the
scope of its remedy is well-tailored to fit the violation. No excess
remedial statutory cloth should be flapping when the judicial
inspection of the legislative tailor occurs. The Court has definitely
assumed command, and it will now be difficult to fabricate broad
legislative remedies of behavior that the Court sees as constitutionally
tolerable. Thus, for example, any attempt by Congress to use its
enforcement powers broadly to curb discrimination against gays and
lesbians will now be difficult to defend successfully. Rather than tilt
at windmills, Congress would do better to fashion pointed legislation
that addresses particularly egregious practices that are of dubious
validity even under minimal scrutiny. Such advice is practical if not
very palatable to those who are impatient to alter mores, and that
illustrates the fact that the Court has made its most significant
doctrinal change in this area.
Yet, some of the Court's emerging doctrine is very much at odds
with a renewed sense of a judicially enforceable federalism. The
Court has greatly expanded the scope of implied preemption, both
field and conflict preemption, and has done so without much regard
for the substantive presumption against preemption. It is more than a
little ironic that the Court has created clear statement rules to ensure
that Congress speaks with unmistakable clarity when it seeks to
invade state sovereignty by using its commerce power but fails to
maintain the functional equivalent of a clear statement rule with
respect to preemption. The consequences of this heedless
abandonment of the presumption against preemption is a vast
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increase of federal authority, perhaps on balance much greater (and
quite likely of more importance) than the federal authority that was
checked in the process autonomy cases or even by the revised
commerce doctrine of Lopez and Morrison.
Moreover, the Court has set about to fuse together state and
federal law in some areas in such a manner that the Court can justify
its independent review of state law in order to determine whether
federal rights have been infringed. At times this will be necessary,
but the necessity of this approach in the areas in which the Court has
chosen to employ it is dubious at best. Perhaps this is a transitory
phenomenon of no great consequence, but it ought to be an occasion
for at least some passing reflection.
Finally, it is important to note what the Court has not done. The
Court has not shrunk the conditional spending power and it has used
preemption to avoid clarifying the extent to which states may regulate
matters that have an effect on foreign affairs and to avoid a square
decision on the free expression rights of advertisers of toxic but legal
cigarettes. Until and unless the Court addresses these issues in a
localist fashion (especially the conditional spending power) it is far
too early to herald a new era of judicially enforceable federalism that
is designed to restore vastly greater authority to states.
The Rehnquist Court lacks a coherent federalism philosophy.
About the best that can be said for its efforts is that it has revived
interest in and attention to the importance of a healthy federalism.
But because of its scattershot approach-adding to state autonomy
here, taking it away there, restricting federal authority in one moment
and adding to it in another-the Court has exposed itself to the
charge that judicially enforceable federalism is as hopelessly
expedient as the politically enforceable alternative. As Justice Grier
said of the Court when it decided Ex Parte McCardle:33  "I am
ashamed that such opprobrium should be cast upon the Court, and
that it cannot be refuted."'33
334. 74 U.S. 506 (1869).
335. Justice Grier's charge was not part of an official dissent but was widely reported in
the newspapers of the time. See, e.g., CHARLES FAIRMAN, 6 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION
AND REUNION, PART ONE: 1864-88 at 473-74 (1971); 3 CHARLES WARREN, THE
SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 204 (1922).
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